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 Impacts from major storms, floods, hurricanes, and heavy precipitation 
events disturb the lives of millions of people around the world every year, causing 
billions of dollars of damages and economic losses.  As the number and destructiveness 
of natural disasters increase, the study of resilience offers possible solutions for 
minimizing loss of life and damage from disasters. Resiliency of communities and 
organizations in the face of global climate change is attracting increasing attention as a 
way to slow or reverse the increasing costliness and disruption of natural disasters. 
Despite the growing interest in resilience, no research focuses on the particular resilience 
challenges facing emergency response organizations (EROs), police, fire, emergency 
medical service, emergency management agencies, and departments of public work, 
which communities rely on for critical life-safety services during and after disasters. 
 The first portion of this study uses the Delphi method to build a list of expert-
derived factors contributing to emergency response organization (ERO) resilience, 
including ranking and rating the factors to develop an expert consensus-based set of 
factors composing the ERO Resiliency Framework. This framework supports decision 
making and planning priorities to develop stronger, more resilient, emergency response 
agencies. The second stage of this research uses the ERO Resiliency Framework to 
develop a reference mental model of ERO resilience and compares 41 ERO leaders in 
three coastal municipalities to the reference model and each other. The gaps in the ERO 
leaders’ mental models revealed by this assessment provide insights into how ERO 
leaders understand resilience in their organizations and highlight opportunities for 
tailored education and outreach efforts, as well as suggesting future research areas.  
	
The third portion of this research focuses on the role of social capital in ERO 
resilience, analyzing the ERO leaders’ levels and types of social capital. Social networks 
of relationships between individuals within the same organization form more resilient 
teams, while strong network relationships between organizations provide essential 
resources, support, and information during times of crisis.  
This research provides key insights into the factors contributing to ERO 
resilience, ERO leaders’ mental models of resilience, and how social capital can 
contribute to building strong, more resilient response organizations. Building resilient 
EROs is an essential component in the development of resilient communities, and the 
results of this research highlight key areas to focus future education and planning efforts 
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  This dissertation is written in the manuscript format containing a brief 
introduction, three independent chapters, and a conclusion. The three chapters form three 
articles that are in preparation for submission for publication. The goal of this dissertation 
is to identify the factors contributing to emergency response organizations’ (EROs) 
resilience, assess ERO leaders’ mental models of resilience to identify 
comprehensiveness and balance, and analyze ERO leaders’ levels of social capital.  
 The first article consists of a Delphi study of emergency response experts to 
determine the key factors contributing to ERO resilience. Eleven key factors are 
identified, forming the Emergency Response Organization Resiliency Framework, and 
providing a foundation for further research on ERO resilience. 
 The second article applies mental model assessment methods to ERO leaders to 
assess and compare their mental models of resilience in their organizations to the 
reference model. Mental model comprehensiveness and balance are analyzed to identify 
gaps in ERO leaders’ default and complete models to inform future research, planning, 
and education efforts.   
 The third article measures ERO leaders’ levels and types of social capital to 
describe social capital’s contributions to ERO resilience. Despite having overall high 
levels of social capital, it is important for EROs to focus on developing and maintaining 
strong relationships and networks between organizations prior to disasters. 
 The three chapters are followed by a conclusion chapter that summarizes all three 
manuscripts and highlights areas for future research.
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 Emergency response organizations (EROs) are a critical component of 
communities’ disaster response, emergency preparedness, and resilience planning efforts; 
yet they are not included in current research efforts focusing on community and 
organizational resilience. As increasing academic and popular attention is applied to the 
topic of resilience, it is essential that EROs are included in the research.  Local EROs are 
uniquely positioned to increase resiliency to climate-related disasters through emergency 
preparedness and response. In addition, EROs have extensive experience in emergency 
planning and response and provide critical public safety functions. Due to the importance 
of community-level adaptation, local emergency planning and disaster preparedness 
efforts must include a focus on local-level EROs in order to increase community 
resilience. Identifying essential factors contributing to emergency response organization 
resilience provides a dual benefit of improving current organizational resilience while 
establishing a framework for long-term community resilience growth. Emergency 
preparedness, disaster risk reduction, and climate change adaptation are all aspects of a 
central goal: increasing communities’ capacity to successfully survive and overcome 
increasingly intense and frequent climate-related natural disasters.  
This study, building off of previous research in the organizational resilience field and 
proposing a model of ERO resilience factors, provides recommendations for 
improvements in the resilience of emergency response organizations that will ultimately 
result in enhanced community resilience to current disasters and projected climate change 
impacts in the future. Using the Delphi method, this research developed a list of expert-




ranked and rated the factors to develop an expert consensus-based set of ERO resilience 
factors forming the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Resiliency Framework. 
The factors ranked by the expert panel as most important with high levels of consensus 
provide a framework to apply organizational resilience principals to emergency response 
organizations.  
The development of the reference mental model of resilience in EROs derived from 
the ERO Resiliency Framework demonstrates one application of the expert-consensus 
driven resiliency framework. Assessing ERO leaders’ mental models of resilience in their 
organizations reveals key gaps in comprehensiveness and balance. Although the ERO 
leaders had relatively well balanced default mental models, the significant increase in 
comprehensiveness between the default and complete models indicates that ERO leaders 
are focusing on a narrower aspect of resilience and would benefit from additional 
trainings and education. As ERO leaders build a greater comfort level and knowledge of 
the nuances of ERO resilience core components, they will be better prepared to 
incorporate resiliency-building strategies in their plans, procedures, and trainings.  
 In addition to examining their mental models of resilience, this study explores 
ERO leaders’ levels and types of social capital to develop a better understanding of how 
EROs approach relationships and social network building. Strong networks of 
relationships between members of a team and between individuals in different 
organizations can contribute to organizations’ social capital, thus providing the 
organization with better access to information, resources, and support during times of 
crisis. All of these aspects contribute to building stronger, more resilient EROs that are 




communities when disasters strike. In order to continue fulfilling their critical function in 
a rapidly changing world, emergency response organizations must incorporate resiliency-
building actions and strategies in their daily operating policies and procedures as well as 
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As the frequency and destructiveness of natural disasters increases due to climatic 
changes and expanding development in vulnerable areas, the study of resilience offers 
possible solutions for minimizing losses from disasters. Much academic attention in the 
literature on resilience focuses on community and organizational resilience generally; 
however, the specific resilience factors essential to emergency response organizations 
have not been identified in previous research. This study used the Delphi method to build 
a list of expert-derived factors contributing to emergency response organization (ERO) 
resilience, including ranking and rating the factors to develop an expert consensus-based 
set of factors composing the ERO Resiliency Framework. This framework supports 
decision making and planning priorities to develop stronger, more resilient, emergency 
response agencies. Resilience of emergency response organizations directly contributes to 
community resilience, leading to stronger communities and organizations that are better 
able to survive and thrive in an age of increasing threats and natural disasters.  
 
1.1 Introduction  
Impacts from major storms, floods, hurricanes, and heavy precipitation events 
disturb the lives of millions across the globe every year, causing billions of dollars of 
damages and economic losses (Paton and Johnston, 2017). Three times as many natural 
disasters were recorded in the nine years between 2000 and 2009 compared to between 
1980 and 1989 (Leaning and Guha-Sapir, 2013). As the number and destructiveness of 
natural disasters increases, the field of resilience and organizational resilience is also 




Resiliency of communities and organizations can slow or reverse the increasing 
costliness and disruption caused by natural disasters. However, a review of literature 
conducted for this study found no scholarship focused on the particular resilience 
challenges facing emergency response organizations (EROs), including police, fire, 
emergency medical service, emergency management agencies, and departments of public 
works, which are relied upon for assisting communities through these disasters.  
When natural disasters occur, EROs must provide critical services in challenging and 
often dangerous environments, and disasters place increased demand on emergency 
services and their resources and personnel.  For the purposes of this study, “emergency 
response organizations” (EROs) will be defined to include fire departments, emergency 
medical services, police departments, public works departments, and Emergency 
Management Agency (EMA) departments (Thompson, J. and Durkovich, 2015). The 
critical functions provided by EROs are essential for community resiliency, and hence 
must be addressed in order to minimize and mitigate the costs of impacts from disasters. 
The concept of organizational resilience, defined by Lee et al. (2013) as “the ability of 
organizations to continue to operate and to provide goods [and] services,” is directly 
applicable to EROs as their services are required throughout natural disasters and major 
emergencies. The resilience of EROs is also a critical component of community 
resilience due to their provision of key life-safety services including medical, fire and 
rescue, and emergency response (Lee et al., 2013). This study, building off of previous 
research in the organizational resilience field and proposing a model of ERO resilience 
factors, provides recommendations for improvements in the resilience of emergency 




current disasters and projected climate change impacts in the future. Using the Delphi 
method, this research developed a list of expert-derived factors contributing to 
Emergency Response Organization (ERO) resilience, then ranked and rated the factors to 
develop an expert consensus-based set of ERO resilience factors. The factors ranked by 
the expert panel as most important with high levels of consensus provide a framework to 
apply organizational resilience principles to emergency response organizations forming 
the Emergency Response Organization Resiliency Framework.  
Current organizational resilience literature emphasizes the increasing importance of 
resilience to all organizations and examines case studies of non-profit organizations, 
retailers, manufacturers, technology suppliers, public utilities, and private contractors 
(Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003; Lee et al., 2013; McManus, 2008). EROs face unique 
circumstances, however, because they must face disasters directly while performing 
critical services. If EROs are incapacitated or unable to perform their roles during a 
disaster there may be severe, possibly life-threatening, consequences for members of the 
community. This study: 1) investigates how an ERO resiliency framework differs from 
existing frameworks and, 2) identifies factors that mitigate the unique hazard challenges 
facing EROs, including climate change related disasters. The resulting framework of 
factors contributing to organizational resilience for EROs provides a foundation for 
recommendations and guidelines that EROs may implement to improve their resilience. 
As climate change impacts become progressively more visible and climate-related 
events affect more people, EROs must be resilient in order to continue to operate 
successfully and provide critical services (Leaning and Guha-Sapir 2013). Emergency 




and individuals are responsible for protecting life and property during extreme weather 
events and the recovery period following major disasters. Local EROs are uniquely 
positioned to increase resiliency to climate-related disasters through emergency 
preparedness and response because EROs have extensive experience in emergency 
planning and response and provide critical public safety functions (Keim, 2008; Tsai, 
2013). Due to the importance of community-level adaptation, local emergency planning 
and disaster preparedness, efforts to build resilience must focus on local-level EROs 
(Yamin et al., 2005; National Academies, 2006). Emergency preparedness, disaster risk 
reduction, and climate change adaptation are all aspects of a central goal: increasing 
communities’ resilience in order to survive and overcome increasingly intense and 
frequent climate-related natural disasters.  
1.2 Background 
Defining Resilience 
The topic of resilience has gained much attention and research interest in the wake of 
increasingly frequent and costly natural disasters experienced across the U.S. and around 
the world (McManus, 2008; Lee et al., 2013; Rodin, 2014). Resiliency of communities 
and organizations in the face of global climate change and large scale disasters is 
attracting focus as a way to slow or reverse the increasing costliness and disruption of 
natural disasters (Keim, 2008; Yamin et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2013; Rodin, 2014; Somers, 
2009). However, resilience is a complex and multi-faceted concept encompassing a wide 
range of disciplinary fields and research methodologies, as well as many facets of 




definition of “resilience” varies greatly in the literature based on the discipline and scale 
at which resiliency is considered.  
While resilience is a broad and complex concept with a wide variety of definitions 
and conceptualizations applied to a diversity of disciplines, there are three main 
approaches to resiliency thought: engineering resilience, ecological/ecosystem resilience, 
and social-ecological resilience. These schools are rooted in the foundation and 
development of resiliency theory, from the relatively narrow definition of engineering 
resilience of bouncing back to a ‘normal’ condition following a shock or disturbance, to 
the ecological resilience understanding of the magnitude of disturbance that can be 
experienced before a system moves into a different state, and broadening to include the 
variety of definitions discussed in social-ecological resilience literature (Holling, 1973, 
Comfort, 2010, Adger et al., 2005, Folke et al., 2002, Aldrich, 2012, Berkes, 2007).This 
variety of definitions illustrates the complexity of resiliency as applied in multiple fields 
and demonstrates the theoretical development of the concept, from the “bounce back to 
normal” component of ecological resiliency (Holling, 1973), to “active resilience” 
including the idea of “bouncing forward” incorporating adaptive actions (Somers, 2009), 
and even the conceptualization of resilience as a “continuum of experiences” and “state 
of becoming” suggested by Walklate et al. (2013).  
Many definitions of resilience include references to “bouncing back,” “learning and 
adapting,” “absorbing disturbances,” and “capacity to cope” with unexpected 
disturbances, sudden changes, or disasters (Masten and Obradovic, 2008; Walkate et al., 




possible definitions, some common themes emerge: resilience entails the ability to adapt 
to and overcome the unknown and unexpected while retaining essential functions. 
The previously discussed definitions of resilience may be considered descriptions of 
“passive resilience,” focusing on the ability of organizations to “bounce back” from 
“unanticipated dangers” (Wildavsky, 1988). Framed in this manner, passive resilience is 
a reaction to an event and reactive in nature (Somers, 2009). In contrast, “active 
resilience” can be differentiated as “a deliberate effort to become better able to cope with 
surprise” (Lovins and Lovins, 1982; Wildavsky, 1988; Somers, 2009), and thus may be 
considered proactive in nature. While passive resilience is discussed more frequently in 
the literature and is generally demonstrated after a major disaster or crisis (Wildavsky, 
1988), active resilience may be more useful to EROs given the challenges and demands 
of their services.  
In her book The Resilience Dividend, Rodin defines “resilience” as the “capacity of 
any entity – an individual, a community, and organization, or a natural system – to 
prepare for disruptions, to recover from shocks and stresses, and to adapt and grow from 
a disruptive experience” (Rodin 2014, p. 3). Rodin’s characterization of “resilience” 
summarizes many of the components of resilience as defined in the literature and served 
as the definition used for the purposes of this study because it is particularly well suited 
for application to emergency response organizations. Due to the increasing demands on 
emergency response organizations during the response to and recovery from large scale 
natural disasters, such as Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2017, these organizations must be 
able to rapidly recover from impacts while continuing to provide essential services to 





 The strategic, conceptual perspective of climate resilience contains multiple types 
of resilience including community, organizational, economic, social, and ecological 
(Comfort, 2010). Thus, on a strategic theoretical level, organizational resilience is a 
contributing sub-category of community resilience to climate impacts. Society’s capacity 
to adapt to climate change is a key component of climate resilience (Adger, 2003). 
Assessing, measuring, and increasing adaptive capacity is a central focus of current 
organizational and community resilience literature, resulting in a variety of suggested 
methods for quantifying potential and latent resilience (Somers, 2009, Mallak, 1998, 
McManus, 2008). These frameworks and assessments provide suggestions and 
recommendations for improving organizational and community resilience, thus 
increasing the capacity for climate resilience in the larger field of disaster and hazard 
resilience to climate change. Networks, institutions, and organizations that promote 
resilience to current hazards and vulnerabilities will simultaneously be engaged in 
building resilience to climate change in the future (Adger et al., 2005).  
Organizational Resilience 
Organizational resilience is a complex blend of behaviors, perspectives and 
interactions that contribute significantly to the resilience of communities (Somers, 2009, 
McManus et al., 2008, Mallak, 1998). Community resilience and organizational 
resilience are interdependent concepts; hence, organizational resilience is an important 
component of communities’ ability to plan for, respond to, and recover from emergencies 
and crises (Lee et al., 2013, McManus et al., 2008, Aldrich, 2012). Organizational 




one of five “dimensions of resilience” following a disaster, supporting the linkage 
between organizational resilience and wider community resilience (Aldrich, 2012).  
Resilience of EROs as Organizations  
There is a diverse literature that discusses measuring and quantifying organizational 
resilience and resilience potential. Key studies by Somers (2009), McManus (2008), and 
Lee et al. (2013) address measuring organizational resilience potential and measuring and 
comparing organizations’ resilience. Somers identified six factors, while McManus 
proposed a model consisting of three factors and 15 indicators of organizational resilience 
(McManus, 2008; Lee et al., 2013). Lee et al.’s (2013) study expanded on McManus’s 
(2008) model, proposing an adjusted model consisting of four factors (Lee et al., 2013, p. 
33). Together these studies identify situation awareness, adaptive capacity, planning, and 
resilience ethos as key resiliency factors with multiple related indicators including 
organizational connectivity, culture of informed decision-making, and transparent 
communication within an organization (Somers, 2009; McManus, 2008; Lee et al., 2013). 
Although these models of organizational resilience provide a foundation in the literature, 
none of the 73 studies reviewed for this research address the specific resilience 
challenges facing emergency response organizations (EROs). As the providers of critical 
response services during times of major disasters, EROs are vital to the well-being, 
survival, and resilience of the communities they serve. Elements of resiliency for EROs 
include being able to continue providing essential life-safety and security functions 
during any kind of impact or disaster, whether natural or human-caused. Emergency 




and circumstances, thus resiliency for these organizations must include factors that allow 
them to retain essential capabilities and continue providing critical services.   
Local EROs are uniquely positioned to increase community resilience through 
emergency preparedness and response. In addition, EROs have extensive experience in 
emergency planning and response and provide critical public safety functions (Keim, 
2008; Tsai, 2013). Due to the importance of community-level adaptation, local 
emergency planning and disaster preparedness efforts must include a focus on local-level 
EROs in order to increase community resilience (Yamin et al., 2005; National 
Academies, 2006). Identifying essential factors contributing to emergency response 
organization resilience provides a dual benefit of improving current organizational 
resilience while supporting a framework for long-term community resilience growth. 
Emergency preparedness, disaster risk reduction, and climate change adaptation are all 
aspects of a central goal: increasing communities’ capacity to successfully survive and 
overcome increasingly intense and frequent climate-related natural disasters.  
1.3 Methodology 
The Delphi Process  
The Delphi process is a widely-accepted method of achieving expert consensus 
concerning a specific problem or issue from a group of individuals with identified 
expertise in the topic area. Originally developed in the 1950’s by Dalkey and Helmer 
(1963) at the RAND Corporation for use in U.S. military projects, the Delphi method has 
been used to build consensus and solve problems in diverse fields such as coastal 




method is particularly useful when there is incomplete knowledge about a problem 
(Delbeq et al., 1975; Skulmoski, et al., 2007) and the method’s flexibility has resulted in 
its use in many sectors including climate change adaptation, vulnerability analysis, health 
care, defense, business, education, information technology, community resilience and 
recovery, and construction engineering (Webster et al., 2003; Mastrandrea and Schneider, 
2004; Arnell, Tompkins, and Adger, 2005; Morgan, Adams, and Keith, 2006; de Franca 
Doria et al., 2009; Hallowell and Gambatese, 2010; Skulmoski, et al., 2007; Okoli and 
Pawlowski, 2004; Alshehri, Rezgui, and Li, 2015; Jordan and Javernick-Will, 2013). 
This study used the Delphi method to build a list of expert-derived factors 
contributing to Emergency Response Organization (ERO) resilience, then rank and rate 
the factors to develop an expert consensus-based set of ERO resilience factors. The 
Delphi method was selected for this research based on its rigorous methodology for 
obtaining expert consensus from individuals across a wide geographical area (Sillars and 
Hallowell, 2009; Jordan and Javernick-Will, 2013).  
Emergency Management and Response Expert Panel Selection 
In order to begin the Delphi process, a panel of experts were recruited from 
emergency management and response professionals using professional organization 
membership lists, lead researchers in the field, and emergency management associations. 
Previous Delphi studies have used panels of varying sizes, from as low as three to as high 
as 80 members, however most studies include eight to 16 panelists (Hallowell and 
Gambatese, 2010). For the purposes of this research, 30 experts were initially recruited 
for the study from the East Coast region with 20 completing all three rounds. The East 




study in order to reduce variability regarding the structure of emergency response 
organizations and the types of hazards expected. The selected panelists included experts 
in the fields of emergency response, emergency planning, organizational resilience, and 
emergency and disaster management. 
Experts were intentionally selected from multiple backgrounds and disciplines in 
order to provide diverse insights in identifying factors contributing to resilience of EROs. 
The initial panel of 30 experts were collected through a review of current published 
literature in the field of emergency management and response, identification of leading 
academic researchers, directors and managers of agencies and departments at the local, 
state, and regional level, and experienced leaders of emergency response departments in 
the East Coast region. During the expert recruitment process, potential panelists were 
divided into three categories, Academic/Research, Administrative/Policy, and Field 
Practitioner, to ensure the various aspects of emergency management, response, 
resilience, and planning were represented in the final expert panel (Table 1.1). Panelists 
in the Academic/Research category primarily served in professor or lecturer positions in 
universities and focused their work on teaching and researching emergency response and 
management related topics. Individuals in the Administrative/Policy category worked in 
management and oversight agencies such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency (RIEMA), the Department of 
Health (DOH), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Field Practitioner panelists 
served in their primary capacity as emergency responders in fire departments, emergency 













Examples of agencies 
and organizations 
Academic/Research 10 6 24 Professors/lecturers in 
academic institutions 
Administrative/Policy 10 7 22 Management/oversight 
agencies, FEMA, 
RIEMA, DOH, DHS 







The criteria required to participate as an expert in a Delphi study vary based on 
the research topic; however, it is essential that clear criteria are identified prior to expert 
recruitment to ensure all panelist meet the determined criteria (Delbecq et al., 1975; 
Okoli and Pawlowski, 2004; Jordan and Javernick-Will, 2013). All experts selected for 
the Delphi expert panel in this study met the minimum requirements of (1) at least 5 
years’ experience working in emergency management, response, or planning, (2) current 
leadership or management position in their organization or agency, (3) field experience in 
at least one emergency response or recovery, (4) knowledge/expertise concerning 
emergency management, response, planning, and/or resilience verified through 
publications in peer reviewed journals or presentations and lectures as appropriate to the 
field. All panelists selected in the Academic/Research category met the additional 
requirements of holding an advanced degree (Masters or PhD) in a relevant field1 and 
																																								 																				
1 Relevant fields included fire science, emergency management, disaster management and 




authored a minimum of three peer reviewed journal articles. The majority of the experts 
selected far exceeded these minimum criteria, many panelists having worked in their 
fields for over 20 years and a mean of 13.5 years.  
Delphi Survey Administration  
Following the selection of the expert panel, online surveys were conducted using 
SurveyMonkey. The three rounds of questionnaires followed the “ranking-type” Delphi 
procedures outlined by Schmidt et al. (2001) consisting of three steps: (1) brainstorming 
of important factors and characteristics, (2) narrowing down initial list of factors to the 
most important ones, (3) ranking or grading the list of important factors (Okoli and 
Pawlowski, 2004). Following this procedure, the first-round open-ended questionnaire 
was circulated requesting that the panelists identify and list as many factors and 
characteristics contributing to the organizational resilience of EROs as possible (Hsu and 
Sandford, 2007). The results of the first questionnaire were collected and assembled into 
a complete list of expert-suggested ERO resilience factors. Responses that contained the 
same factors with different wording were condensed into one factor in the compiled list. 
For example, the responses “being trained in incident command system,” and 
“conducting incident command system training” were condensed to “incident command 
system training” in the second-round survey. The compiled list was recirculated to the 
panel in the second questionnaire in order to determine which of the listed factors were 
most important and eliminate factors determined by the experts to be unrelated to ERO 
resilience or unimportant (Hsu and Sandford, 2007). Factors’ importance to emergency 
response organization resilience were ranked using a five-point Likert scale with one 




determined to be “not important” to ERO resilience by 90% or more of the expert panel 
were removed following the second-round survey.  
Consensus began to develop in the results of the second-round questionnaire and 
was evaluated using criteria determined prior to data collection based on 
recommendations from relevant Delphi literature (Hsu and Sandford, 2007; Mcleod et al., 
2015; Hasson, Keeney, and McKenna, 2000; Keeney, Hasson, and McKenna, 2006). 
Based on the research conducted by Hsu and Sandford (2007) and Mcleod et al. (2015), 
the criteria for consensus were defined as: high (80-100% of panelists ranked the factor 
as “very important” and “important” or 70%-100 of panelists ranking the factor as “very 
important”); medium (70-80% of panelists ranking as “very important” and “important” 
or 60-80% ranking as “very important”); low (55-70% ranking “very important” and 
“important” or 50-70% ranking “very important”); and none (<55% of ranking “very 
important and important”) (Mcleod et al., 2015; Hsu and Sandford, 2007).  
Following the second-round questionnaire all factors ranked as “not important” or 
“of little importance” with medium and high levels of expert panel consensus were 
discarded from the third-round questionnaire. In the third and final questionnaire 
panelists were asked to rank the remaining factors again using the same Likert scale. 
Prior to evaluating and ranking the factors panelists reviewed the median and mode of the 
previous rankings and summarized notes regarding justification for rankings that 
panelists were encouraged to make in the previous round.  
The results of the third-round questionnaire were analyzed using the consensus 
criteria previously discussed. Each factors’ mean, median, and mode, minimum and 




outcome of this multi-round consensus-based methodology is an expert-produced, 
verified, and ranked list of factors critical to emergency response organization resilience.  
1.4 Results  
 Thirty experts were contacted and asked to participate in the Delphi expert panel, 
with twenty experts agreeing to contribute to the study. After the first-round survey, the 
expert panel produced a list of 36 factors contributing to emergency response 
organization resilience. Following the second-round survey during which the panel 
ranked the factors’ importance on a five-point Likert scale, seven factors from the 
original list were discarded based on low rankings of importance from the panel. The 
remaining 29 factors were re-evaluated by the expert panel in the third round of surveys. 
Following the final round, 11 factors ranked as highly important with a high level of 
expert consensus, summarized in Table 1.2. An additional eight factors ranked as highly 
important with a medium level of consensus (Table 1.3), and 10 factors ranked as 
moderately important with low levels of expert consensus (Table 1.4).  
Expert Panel Ranking of Resilience Factors with High Consensus 
Consensus was determined based on the criteria implemented by Hsu and 
Sandford (2007) and Mcleod et al. (2015), with high consensus defined as 80-100% of 
panelists ranking a particular factor as “very important” and “important.” Factors were 
also determined to have a high consensus of agreement when 70-100% of panelists 
identified the factor as “very important” to ERO resilience. Based on these criteria, the 11 
factors summarized in Table 1.2 were determined to be important to ERO resilience with 




4.45 on a 5-point Likert scale with 4 equivalent to “important” and 5 equivalent to “very 
important.”  
Table 1.2. Ranking of 11 high-consensus resilience factors using a 5-point Likert scale (1 
= “not important,” 2 = “of little importance,” 3 = “somewhat important,” 4 = “important,” 
5 = “very important”; n=20).  
 
 
Expert Panel Ranking of Resilience Factors with Medium Consensus  
The seven factors ranked by the expert panel as high importance with a medium 
degree of consensus (70-79% agreement) include two resilience factors identified in 
previous organizational resilience studies and five factors suggested by the Delphi 




Ability to effectively identify organizational needs High (95%) 4.2 
Establishment and maintenance of clear 
communication within organization and externally 
High (90%) 4.4 
Ability to adapt to changing conditions  High (90%) 4.45 
Ability to establish and maintain clear objectives High (85%) 4.15 
Preparedness of organization for disasters and/or 
impacts 
High (85%) 4.05 
Effective management of available capital 
(financial, human, social) 
High (83%) 3.94 
Engage in relationship building activities prior to 
an incident  
High (83%) 4.18 
Availability of and/or access to adequate personnel 
and staffing 
High (83%) 3.82 
Knowledge of and access to available resources  High (83%) 3.94 
Implementation of efficient logistics within 
organization 
High (80%) 4.15 
Conduct regular exercises and trainings, providing 
opportunity to exercise plans, determine gaps and 
opportunities to improve plans  




experts (see Table 1.3). Rodin (2014) discusses redundant systems as an organization 
having different sources of capacity so that it may continue operations even when 
elements or assets are missing. The expert panel also identified redundant systems as 
important components of resilient organizations, especially redundancy within operations 
and logistics so that emergency response organizations can maintain operational 
effectiveness and logistical continuity during and immediately after an impact. Rodin 
(2014), Somers (2009), and Lee et al. (2013) all include aspects of awareness, analysis, 
and understanding of locally relevant risks and hazards as key to organizational 
resilience. The expert panelists supported the importance of situational awareness, 
including awareness of local hazards. Through the Delphi survey, the experts also 
reached a 72% consensus level on the importance of personal preparedness of emergency 
responders, including preparedness of family members. 
Table 1.3. Ranking of 7 medium-consensus resilience factors using a 5-point Likert scale 
(1 = “not important,” 2 = “of little importance,” 3 = “somewhat important,” 4 = 
“important,” 5 = “very important”).  
ERO resilience factors identified by expert panel Consensus Level of 
Importance 
Mean 
Availability of and/or access to adequate equipment 
to carry out assignments 
Medium (78%) 3.76 
Redundant systems, redundant operations and 
logistics 
Medium (75%) 3.9 
Standardized operating procedures Medium (75%) 3.9 
Personal preparedness of emergency responders, 
including preparedness of family members  
Medium (72%) 3.76 
Situational awareness to successes, challenges, 
lessons learned within organization  
Medium (70%) 3.95 
Ability to anticipate the "what if" scenarios; 
determining proactive actions and decisions 
Medium (70%) 3.65 





Expert Panel Ranking of Resilience Factors with Lower and No Consensus  
After the third round of surveys were complete, the expert panel had reached no 
consensus on seven of the original 36 factors and had reached low consensus on an 
additional 11 factors (see Table 1.4 and Table 1.5). All of the no consensus factors were 
ranked between 2.6 and 3.29 in importance, indicating that while the experts did not 
agree on the factors’ overall ranking, the mean scale of importance was notably lower 
than the factors with higher levels of consensus with no panelist giving any factor a 
ranking higher than “somewhat important.” The 11 factors that achieved low levels of 
consensus from the expert panel had mean rankings of importance higher than the no 
consensus group, with mean rankings of importance between 3.47 and 3.84. All of these 
low consensus factors displayed widely differing rankings of importance from the expert 
panel that did not narrow to closer agreement after three rounds of surveys. These results 
indicate that the expert panelists were firmly attached to their original rankings of 
importance and were largely unwilling to change their rankings to either higher or lower 
levels of importance.  




Access to political and/or jurisdictional support Low (67%) 3.47 
Participation in mitigation activities to reduce risk prior to 
a disaster 
Low (65%) 3.7 
Planning (for example: establishment of pre-incident 
action plans, pre-plans in place, ability to understand the 
steps and procedures required to address likely incidents) 
Low (63%) 3.79 
Development and/or implementation of best practices 
within organization 




Table 1.4. Ranking of 11 lower-consensus resilience factors using a 5-point Likert scale 
(1 = “not important,” 2 = “of little importance,” 3 = “somewhat important,” 4 = 
“important,” 5 = “very important”).  
Table 1.5. Ranking of 7 no-consensus resilience factors using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = 
“not important,” 2 = “of little importance,” 3 = “somewhat important,” 4 = “important,” 5 
= “very important”).  
 
 
Motivation, integrity, pride of emergency responders in 
organization 
Low (61%) 3.53 
Active information and intelligence gathering, seeking 
latest information pertaining to training, equipment, 
operations 
Low (60%) 3.6 
Situational awareness to ongoing risks, hazards, events 
outside organization 
Low (60%) 3.8 
Maintain current relationships through joint exercises or 
trainings, maintain current mutual aid agreements 
Low (56%) 3.65 
Emotional stability of emergency responders Low (56%) 3.65 
Overall health and fitness of emergency responders Low (56%) 3.53 
Access to financial resources to support emergency 
response activities  
Low (56%) 3.47 
ERO resilience factors identified by expert panel Consensus Level 
of Importance 
Mean 
Access to subject matter experts None (39%) 3.06 
Effective engagement with all domains of society - 
for profit, non-profit, religious organizations, and 
social service organizations  
None (39%) 3.29 
Ability to utilize and follow the principles of 
emergency management  
None (37%) 3.16 
ICS training and adherence to NIMS None (37%) 3.05 
Previous experience with disaster response None (33%) 2.82 
Cross training of staff between different 
sections/departments of organization 
None (28%) 3.12 





The 11 factors ranked by the expert panel as most important to ERO 
organizational resilience with high levels of consensus were used to develop a framework 
(Figure 1.1) applying organizational resilience principles to emergency response 
organizations. These factors highlight key elements of resilience for EROs, and many of 
the expert-identified factors are practices that are already included to an extent in 
response organization structure and operations. In addition to the 11 most important 
factors, the results of the expert panel surveys provide a list of secondary factors that 
response organizations may also consider in developing resilience plans (Table 1.3). 
Despite the wide variety of environments and communities served by emergency 
response organizations, the resiliency framework factors are relevant for many locations 
and situations. For example, the ability to adapt to changing conditions is applicable to all 
emergency response organizations, whether they are a large city fire department with 400 
active firefighters or a part-time rural emergency management director reliant on 
volunteers during disasters. This initial checklist of resilience factors provides a starting 
place for response organizations to examine their resilience and identify implementable 
factors and practices to improve their resilience prior to the next disaster. 
Emergency Response Organization Resiliency Framework   
The eleven factors that emerged from the Delphi panel survey with high levels of 
importance and high degrees of consensus (between 80-95% agreement) provide an 
expert-derived list of factors contributing to ERO resilience that can inform resilience-




These key resilience factors may be grouped into four areas of focus: resource 
management, operations/logistics, planning, and situational awareness (Figure 1.1). 
While some of the factors identified through this study support other organizational 
resilience research findings, several unique factors were identified that are particularly 
relevant to emergency response organizations. The identification of these factors allows 
them to be included and emphasized in revisions of plans and procedures for response 
organizations.  
Figure 1.1. Emergency Response Organization Resiliency Framework.  
 The results of this study reinforce findings of previous resilience research efforts 
as well as contributing new factors specifically focused on ERO resilience. The Delphi 
expert panel identified and ranked four factors as important to emergency response 




reviewed for this study. The ability to effectively identify organizational needs was 
ranked as important with the highest consensus rate of all factors, 95%. The other factors 
uniquely recognized as important for ERO resilience are the ability to establish and 
maintain clear objectives, implementation of efficient logistics within the organization, 
and effective management of available financial, human, and social capital. The critical 
response component of emergency response organizations necessitates the establishment 
of sound logistics and clear objectives, which can only be achieved through efficient 
management of resources. During large scale disasters resources are likely to be depleted 
rapidly, making resource management critically important for ERO’s ability to continue 
response operations.  
Seven ERO resiliency factors identified by the expert panel support components 
of resilience frameworks in existing research. McManus (2008) and Lee et al. (2013) 
discuss the establishment and maintenance of clear communication within an 
organization and externally with partners and stakeholders as a key element of resilience. 
The importance of this factor was supported with the Delphi expert panel who gave it a 
mean ranking of 4.4 with 90% consensus. McManus (2008) and Lee et al. (2013) also 
identified engagement in relationship building activities prior to an incident and 
conducting and participating in regular trainings and exercises as key resilience factors. 
The expert panel identified both of these factors as important with mean rankings of 4.18 
and 3.95 respectively with high levels of consensus. Rodin (2014) noted the importance 
of an organization’s ability to adapt to changing conditions, which the expert panel 
strongly agreed with. The expert panel ranked this factor as highly important (a mean 




consensus on this factor are indicative of the expert-acknowledged need for emergency 
response organizations to remain flexible, adaptable, and resilient in the face of changes 
due to environmental factors, such as climate change, and to human-related factors, such 
as changing response types and community needs.  
 Mallack (1998) identified access to appropriate resources as a key element of 
resilience, similar to the expert panels identification of knowledge of and access to 
available resources as important with a consensus level of 83%. The resources that are 
appropriate to a particular response, and their availability, is likely to vary considerably 
based on the type and degree of impact for a disaster, however maintaining the awareness 
of and accessibility to resources contributes to organizational preparedness and hence 
resilience. Lee et al. (2013) discusses the importance of staff engagement and 
involvement, with similarities to the Delphi panel’s identification of availability of and 
access to adequate personnel and staffing as a key resilience factor. Personnel and staff 
must be engaged in the organization with involvement in organizational activities and 
trainings in order to be adequately prepared for serving in an emergency response 
capacity during an incident or disaster. The expert panel ranked preparedness of the 
organization for disasters and/or impacts as important with a consensus of 85%, echoing 
Hollnagel et al.’s (2007) discussion of the ability to respond to various disturbances and 
to regular and irregular threats as key to organizational resilience.  
Implementing ERO Resiliency Factors 
 One challenge to implementing improved resiliency measures and practices is the 
scarcity of available financial resources to support such efforts. However, the resiliency 




emergency response organizations’ operations with minimal financial support. 
Identification of organizational needs and implementation of efficient logistics are 
achievable through improved planning and training of organizations’ leaders. Most 
emergency response organizations engage in regular training and exercises both 
internally and with exterior mutual aid organizations. These trainings may be 
intentionally designed to incorporate resiliency building measures, such as reviewing and 
revising disaster response plans, engaging in mutual aid and large scale exercises with 
neighboring organizations, reviewing available resources, and practicing clear inter- and 
intra-organizational communications. One of the factors with a medium level of 
consensus (72%) was the importance of personal preparedness of emergency responders, 
including preparedness of family members. As noted by one panelist, emergency 
response personnel need to be confident that their homes and families will be safe during 
a disaster in order for them to be fully committed to working during an event and not 
using vacation or sick time to stay home and care for their families. If organizations 
implement personal preparedness training as a component of regular drills and exercises, 
they can develop a well-prepared staff whose homes and families will be ready for the 
next disaster. Through the development of resiliency-focused and preparedness oriented 
trainings and operating procedures, emergency response organizations can take steps to 
improve their organizational resiliency and become more prepared for future impacts.  
Differences Between ERO Resiliency Framework and Previous Frameworks 
Although some factors overlap with previous organizational resilience research 
findings, the marked differences in the additional factors address the multitude of 




organizations do not have to cope with. It is especially noteworthy that several of the low 
and no consensus factors are aspects of organizational resilience that have been identified 
as highly important to resilience in non-emergency response organizations. Access to 
subject matter experts was identified by Lee et al. (2013) as a key element in 
organizational resilience, however the Delphi expert panel ranked this factor with a mean 
of 3.06 (somewhat important) with no consensus, with one panelist recording they 
thought the factor was “not at all important” and two experts ranking the factor as “very 
important.” Similarly, training in Incident Command Systems (ICS) and adherence to the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS) was ranked a mean of 3.05 (somewhat 
important) with no consensus and expert panelist rankings from “not at all important” to 
“very important.” Training in ICS and NIMS is required for the majority of fire 
department, police, emergency medical services, and emergency management personnel 
and has been suggested as a key component of improving these organizations’ resilience 
during disasters (Waugh 2009).While training in ICS and NIMS may improve 
organizations’ interoperability and effective management on emergency scenes, the 
expert panelists in this study do not support the importance of this factor in improving 
emergency response organizations’ resilience.  
 Use of decentralized command and cross training staff between different sections 
within an organization are identified as key organizational resilience factors in non-
emergency response organizations (McManus, 2008; Lee et al., 2013; Mallak, 1998). 
However, the expert panel did not reach any consensus regarding their importance to 
emergency response organizations with rankings ranging from “not at all important” to 




to their lack of consensus on these factors and future research may focus on identifying 
how experts’ backgrounds relate to these factors’ rankings of importance.  
 One factor’s lack of consensus is particularly notable: the expert panel reached no 
consensus on the importance of previous experience with disaster response, with 
respondents’ rankings varying from “not at all important” to “very important.” Previous 
studies on disaster response cite previous response experience as an important contributor 
to resilience to future disasters (McDaniels, 2008), however the expert panel was unable 
to reach consensus regarding the factor’s importance for emergency response 
organizations. The expert panel’s lack of agreement on these low-consensus factors, 
many of which are acknowledged as important to non-response organizations, indicate 
the importance of identifying resilience factors applicable to emergency response 
organizations, taking into consideration their unique responsibilities and challenges 
during a disaster event.  
ERO Resilience Contribution to Community Resilience  
The ample literature on community-level adaptive capacity, collective action, 
organizational resilience, and social capital testifies to the importance of building 
resilience, from the local community and organizational level up to the national level 
(Adger et al., 2005, Adger, 2003, Keim, 2008, Aldrich, 2012). From an operational 
perspective, building resilience and increasing adaptive capacity requires engagement 
with organizations, groups, and individuals on a community level in order to promote and 
enable collective action focused on resiliency (Adger, 2003, Keim, 2008). Hence, 
implementation of strategies and objectives designed to improve organizational resilience 




operationalized concept of organizational resilience contributing to overall 
disaster/climate resilience is the case of restoring port function in the Port of New York 
following Superstorm Sandy. The organizational resilience and utilization of social 
capital displayed during the activation of the Marine Transportation System Recovery 
Unit (MTS-RU) significantly enhanced the Port’s response and recovery capabilities and 
contributed to overall community resilience to a climate change-related hazard through 
minimization of Port closure time and rapid restoration of full services (Sturgis et al., 
2014, Smythe, 2015). 
Limitations of the Study 
 This study’s geographic focus on the East Coast region was selected in order to 
reduce variability in the structure of emergency response organizations, however the 
geographic location results in some limitations in the applicability of the study findings. 
Given that the expert panel were all selected from the same region, from Maine to the 
mid-Atlantic coastal area, the type of hazards considered are limited. Hurricanes, severe 
winter storms, and flooding are the primary natural hazards of concern in this region, 
while hazards such as earthquakes, tsunamis, and large wildfires are less of a risk. The 
focus on certain hazard types and the exclusion of others may lead to bias in the 
resiliency factors identified. For example, the expert panel may consider factors 
contributing to resiliency to hurricane impacts of greater importance than factors that 
would mitigate the damage of wildfires. Thus, the results of this study may be limited in 






 The emergency response organizational resilience factors identified through the 
Delphi expert panel form a framework on which to build stronger, more resilient response 
organizations. The ERO Resiliency Framework identifies factors that are missing in prior 
studies focused on non-emergency organizations, demonstrating the importance of 
considering the unique resiliency challenges and criteria facing emergency response 
organizations. Resiliency frameworks and factors developed for organizations such as 
manufacturers and retailers have some applicability to EROs, as demonstrated by the 
overlapping factors identified by the expert panel. However, in order to withstand future 
impacts and continue providing critical services during and after disaster events, 
emergency response organizations need to consider additional resiliency factors as well. 
When a large storm is anticipated a retailer or manufacturer can close their business or 
move operations to a different site while the affected area sustains the impact and 
recovers. Emergency response personnel, in contrast, must report for work during and 
after the event, providing critical services to the affected community while their own 
homes and families may be at risk. In order to continue delivering emergency services 
during and immediately after large events, response organizations must have resilient 
plans and operations already implemented. The development of resilience-focused 
trainings, engagement in mutual-aid and neighboring agency exercises, and promoting an 
organizational emphasis on building resiliency and preparedness will help EROs become 
more resilient to the next disaster or disturbance they face. Incorporating the ERO 




emergency response organizations grow into strong, resilient organizations better 
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Purpose: As community and organizational resilience become increasingly important 
elements of disaster response and emergency preparedness, examining emergency 
response organizations (ERO) leaders’ mental models of resilience provides essential 
insights into what they know and value with respect to key resiliency concepts and 
approaches to resiliency planning. 
Design/methodology: This study examines ERO resilience knowledge and awareness 
through the application of mental model analysis of ERO leaders in three coastal New 
England municipalities. 41 ERO leaders were interviewed and their default and complete 
mental models were assessed for comprehensiveness and balance in comparison to an 
expert derived reference model.   
Findings: Comparisons of the participants’ default and complete mental models revealed 
low default model comprehensiveness scores in all three sites (45%-51%) that increase 
notably during researcher-prompted structured questions (84%-90%). In contrast, 
participants’ mental model balance scores showed little change between prompted and 
unprompted portions of the interview. 
Research limitations: The research was limited by the focus on three case study sites. 
Future research may expand to a wider scope to include more study areas in a variety of 
risk environments, such as tornado-prone regions and areas vulnerable to wildfires.  
Practical implications: The identification and description of ERO leaders’ mental 
models highlights the gaps and inaccuracies in the participant’s mental models. 




models concerning resilience due to discussion and input from others. The results of this 
mental model assessment provide insights that can inform future emergency response 
resilience education and planning initiatives in addition to suggesting areas for future 
research.  
Originality: This research applies mental model methods to the study of ERO resilience 
in order to address the current gap in academic literature. The study results also suggest 
new areas for research and inquiry pertaining to successful application of resiliency 
initiatives in the emergency response community.  
Key words: emergency response organization, resilience, mental model methods 






2.1 Introduction  
Emergency response organizations (EROs) are a critical component of communities’ 
disaster response, emergency preparedness, and resilience planning efforts. Although 
there are many current research efforts focusing on community and organizational 
resilience (Somers, 2009; Rodin, 2014; Lee et al., 2013; Mallak, 1998; McManus et al., 
2008), little research focuses specifically on resilience in EROs. In order to build 
communities that are ready to face the challenges of a rapidly changing world with 
increasing climate-related risks and hazards, EROs must become fully involved in 
resiliency-building and planning initiatives. This study focuses on the five EROs 
identified by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in the Emergency Services 
Sector-Specific Plan: fire, police and law enforcement, emergency medical services, 
emergency management agencies, and public works departments (Thompson, J. and 
Durkovich, 2015). These five key response organizations provide essential emergency 
and routine life-safety services to their communities in day-to-day operations, and serve 
as first responders during large scale incidents or disasters such as hurricanes, blizzards, 
or terrorist attacks. Due to their roles in routine operations as well as disaster events, 
incorporating EROs in resiliency planning initiatives can contribute to community 
resilience by ensuring the continued provision of essential life-safety services during any 
incident or impact (Lee et al., 2013). This study focuses on identifying and describing 
ERO leaders’ mental models of resiliency within their organizations and identifies the 
components of resilience they value most.  
 This study examines ERO resilience understanding and awareness through the 




towns, Westerly, Rhode Island, West Haven, Connecticut, and Stratford, Connecticut. 
Mental models are an “individual’s internal representation of an external problem or 
phenomenon,” and as such offer a unique perspective on the world view and 
understanding each person brings to their decision-making, behavior, and attitudes 
(Smythe and Thompson, 2015; Gentner and Stevens, 1983). As community and 
organizational resilience become increasingly important elements of disaster response 
and emergency preparedness, understanding ERO leaders’ mental models of resilience 
provide important insights into their knowledge of key resiliency concepts and approach 
to resiliency planning. This study defines resilience as the “capacity of any entity – an 
individual, a community, or an organization – to prepare for disruptions, to recover from 
shocks and stresses, and to adapt and grow from a disruptive experience” (Rodin, 2014). 
Current literature provides a wide variety of definitions for “resilience,” however Rodin’s 
definition was selected based on a thorough literature review. This article forms one 
section of a larger mixed-methods study that developed an expert derived and verified 
ERO Resiliency Framework (see Manuscript 1), applied information developed from the 
Framework to build an expert mental model of ERO resilience, and analyzed mental 
models of ERO leaders in the field to identify gaps and differences in leaders’ mental 
models compared to the expert mental model.   
 The mental models of ERO leaders were analyzed using the concepts of mental 
model “comprehensiveness” and “balance” developed by Smythe and Thompson (2015) 
in order to develop an understanding of the leaders’ primary focuses and knowledge 
areas. Moreover, this study examined the discrepancies between the ERO leaders’ models 




leaders’ current understanding and approach to resilience, which may inform future 
resiliency education, policy, and planning efforts.   
2.2 Resilience in Emergency Response Organizations 
As the field of community and organizational resilience attracts increasing 
academic and governmental attention, the lack of research focusing on ERO resilience is 
notable. Current organizational resilience literature emphasizes the increasing importance 
of resilience to all organizations and examines case studies of non-profit organizations, 
retailers, manufacturers, technology suppliers, public utilities, and private contractors 
(Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003; Lee et al., 2013; McManus et al., 2008). Although these 
studies provide recommendations and guidelines for multiple types of organizations, 
none of them provide guidance for emergency response organizations. Defining the roles 
EROs play in communities and their responsibilities is essential to understanding their 
importance in resiliency efforts. Fire departments are responsible for providing fire 
suppression, rescue operations, hazardous material response, and incident command in 
addition to other functions. Police departments serve as the law enforcement agency, 
responsible for maintaining security, managing people and traffic, and responding to 
critical violent incidents. Emergency medical services may be provided by fire 
departments, private companies, or municipal departments and are responsible for 
providing medical response in the out-of-hospital setting. Emergency management 
agencies serve a key function as the management organization responsible for planning, 
preparing, mitigating, and responding to natural disasters or human-caused incidents. 
Public works departments also serve an essential emergency response function by 




that may be damaged, and working in coordination with the previously listed response 
organizations to access individuals in need of assistance. Communities rely on the critical 
life-safety services provided by EROs on a daily basis as well as during extreme disaster 
events; thus, the resilience of EROs within a community are an essential component of 
improved community resilience. However, EROs face unique challenges in improving 
resilience that other organizations such as retailers and manufacturers do not encounter. 
For example, emergency responders cannot move personnel and equipment and relocate 
to areas outside the impact zone until the disaster has passed as is recommended for 
organizations such as manufacturers and non-profits (Sutcliffe and Vogus, 2003). Nor 
can emergency response personnel work remotely from home or other secure locations. 
Due to the nature of the critical services provided, emergency responders must report for 
duty when other employees may be advised to shelter at home or in emergency shelters.  
Thus, resilience-building factors applicable to EROs must take into consideration the 
unique situations and challenges facing emergency responders during disaster events and 
their fundamental role in daily emergency operations.  
The ERO Resiliency Framework was developed to address the lack of ERO-
specific resiliency strategies in current literature and to produce recommendations 
directly applicable and translatable to ERO practitioners working in communities (see 
Manuscript 1). The Framework outlines the eleven key resilience factors in four areas of 
focus: resource management, operations/logistics, planning, and situational awareness. 
The Framework was developed through a Delphi-method survey of emergency 
response experts including highly experienced field practitioners, academic researchers, 




study and findings resulting in the development of the ERO Resiliency Framework. 
Identifying key factors contributing to ERO resilience is essential to creating translatable 
and actionable resilience-building recommendations that EROs may apply to their plans, 
procedures, and training to begin the process of improving their resilience. In order to be 
most effective in developing ERO resilience-building initiatives and plans, it is essential 
to understand ERO leaders’ mental models of their organizations’ resilience.  
2.3 Mental Models Applied to EROs 
A mental model is “an individual’s internal cognitive representation of a real-
world or hypothetical domain, problem, or phenomenon” and forms the basis of the 
individual’s world view, impacting their behavior, decision making, communication, and 
reasoning (Gentner and Stevens, 1983; Smythe and Thompson, 2015; Jones et al., 2011; 
Ladosz, 2015). The concept of mental models was originally proposed by the 
psychologist Kenneth Craik (1943), who suggested that the nature of human thought was 
the manipulation of internal representations and understanding of the world. Craik’s 
theory was expanded by Johnson-Laird (1980) in work proposing that mental models 
carried important lessons for cognitive science, processing, and reasoning. Mental models 
are highly dynamic and although they do not change easily, models may adapt to 
changing circumstances and evolve over time (Jones et al., 2011). The introduction of 
new information, further training, or exposure to new experiences may alter individuals’ 
mental models, reshaping them or adding additional details. Mental model analysis, a 
method that extracts participants’ cognitive conceptualizations about a specific subject, 
form a key component of research into individuals’ knowledge, beliefs, values, and 




understanding how individuals approach and solve problems, make decisions, and 
perceive their surroundings (Hulst, 2012; Smythe and Thompson, 2015; Ladosz, 2015). 
Use of mental model analysis allows researchers to gain important insight into how 
individuals “internally represent complex, dynamic systems and how these 
representations change over time” (Jones et al., 2011). Better understanding of how 
individuals conceive of and view particular practices, concepts, and problems may be 
used in a wide variety of ways, including enhanced decision making, development of 
better management policies, and improved communication (Zaksek and Arvai, 2004; 
Stone-Jovicich et al., 2011, Jones et al., 2011). Mental model analysis methods have been 
successfully applied to a variety of disciplines including coastal zone and coastal 
ecosystem management (Hulst, 2012; Smythe and Thompson, 2015), water use and 
management (Mathevet et al., 2011, Stone-Jovicich et al., 2011, Kolkman and van der 
Veen, 2005), flood risk management (Wood et al., 2012), natural resource management 
(Zaksek and Arvai, 2004), risk communication (Morgan et al., 2002), and volunteer 
tourism (Ladosz, 2015). 
Although mental model analysis provides unique insights into individuals’ 
understandings and perceptions, it also presents challenges. It may be difficult to 
differentiate and elicit the mental models that subjects genuinely rely on to make 
decisions and take actions rather than the mental models that they may externally 
“espouse” but not actually use in their internal decision making and conceptualization 
process (Jones et al., 2011). It is also possible that the mental models elicited during the 
study may be inaccurate and/or incomplete due to the exclusion of some stakeholders or 




Mental models must be viewed as “functional rather than complete or accurate 
representations of reality” due to the fact that by nature mental models are a simplified 
representation of reality (Jones et al., 2011). Additionally, due to cognitive limitations, it 
may not be “possible nor desirable to represent in a mental model every detail that may 
be found in reality” (Jones et al., 2011; Smythe and Thompson, 2015; Ladosz, 2015). In 
spite of the incomplete representation of reality obtained through mental model research, 
it remains a valuable methodological tool for assessing individuals’ internal 
understandings and cognitive representations of the outside world (Jones et al., 2011).  
Implementing resilience in EROs is an inherently complex goal involving 
identifying and changing outdated attitudes and traditions, developing new habits and 
methods of approaching organizational responsibilities, and engaging diverse 
stakeholders in new approaches to daily activities as well as disaster events. The use of 
mental model analysis is particularly appropriate for the purposes of this research. The 
identification of ERO leaders’ mental models is essential to fully understanding their 
current comprehension and knowledge of resilience prior to implementing resilience-
building initiatives. Understanding the mental models of the numerous different 
individuals involved in community emergency response helps identify gaps in 
knowledge, responders’ varying levels of understanding pertaining to resilience and risk, 
and their attitudes, preferences, and values (Mathevet et al., 2011; Smythe and 
Thompson, 2015; Jones et al., 2011). Identifying mental models and making them 
explicit can help both trainers and planners adapt and adjust existing plans and education 




Emergency response leaders’ ability to understand the multiple components of 
ERO resilience is essential in order for them to implement resilience as an organizational 
goal and incorporate resiliency factors in trainings, planning, and operations. Hence, 
assessing ERO leaders’ current mental models of resilience and identifying gaps in 
knowledge and understanding contributes to the success of their department’s education, 
trainings, and planning efforts. Through the use of mental model interviews and analysis, 
a comprehensive view of ERO leaders’ varying mental models regarding their 
organizations’ resilience emerge.  
2.4 Methodology 
This study applied a comparative case study approach using mental model 
methodology to assess ERO leaders’ conceptualization and understanding of resilience in 
three case study sites in coastal southern New England: Westerly, Rhode Island, West 
Haven, Connecticut, and Stratford, Connecticut. These sites were selected based on their 
similarities and thus comparability. Specifically, each site is a mid-sized (population 
23,000-54,500 according to the U.S. Census Bureau, 2011)) coastal community that 
sustained impact and damages from Superstorm Sandy (2012), has taken identifiable 
steps towards reducing future impacts of major storms, and has municipal-based 
emergency services including fire departments, police departments, emergency medical 
services (EMS), emergency management agencies (EMA), and public works 
departments. Interview subjects were recruited from each ERO based on their leadership 
role within the organizations. A total of 41 ERO leaders were interviewed for this 
research, 15 in Westerly, 10 in West Haven, and 16 in Stratford, providing a total 




 The methods used in this study are based on the mental model methodology 
outlined by Morgan et al. (2002) consisting of four steps: (1) developing the “reference 
model,” an expert model of ERO resilience, (2) conducting mental model interviews with 
leaders in each of the five identified EROs in the selected study locations, (3) 
transcribing, coding, and analyzing the interview transcripts, and (4) comparing 
interviewees’ mental models with the reference model (Smythe and Thompson, 2015; 
Morgan et al., 2002). This methodological framework provides the foundation in the 
application of previously tested and verified methods to a new area of inquiry, emergency 






























 The development of the reference model, the expert model of ERO resilience, was 
based on the key components of organizational resilience identified through a review of 
current academic literature and expanded based on the results of the Delphi study of 
emergency response experts described in Manuscript 1. The core components of the 
reference model (planning, resource management, situational awareness, and 
operations/logistics, see Figure 2.1) are identified as essential aspects of organizational 
resilience in multiple studies and their relevance to EROs was confirmed through the 
Delphi study described in Manuscript 1 (Rodin, 2014; Mallak, 1998; Somers, 2009; Lee 
et al., 2013; McManus et al., 2008). The Delphi study also contributed additional details 
to the reference model that focused on emergency response organizations’ resilience. The 
literature reviewed in this study does not address the specific factors relevant to ERO 
resilience, hence the expert insights obtained through the Delphi portion of this research 
add depth to the expert model. The combination of literature-derived and expert-derived 
components in the development of the expert model provides a more comprehensive 
reference model including both the academic literature and expert practitioner input (see 
Figure 2.1). The reference model formed the basis for the development of the interview 
instrument and was reviewed for comprehensiveness by two resilience experts and two 






Figure 2.2: The Emergency Response Organizational (ERO) Resiliency Framework, 
including the core components of ERO resilience. 
Mental model interviews were conducted using the “funnel design” and “prompting” 
approach outlined by Morgan et al. (2002) and applied by Smythe and Thompson (2015). 
Each interview began with broad open-ended questions and then narrowed to a series of 
researcher-prompted questions. The initial questions were designed to be intentionally 
broad in order to elicit the participants’ unprompted thoughts regarding resilience in their 
organizations with minimal influence from the interviewer. This approach allows a 
researcher to learn what is most salient to the interviewee. Initial phase questions such as 
“Could you tell me about resilience in your organization?” were followed up with 
questions such as “Could you tell me more about ____?” or “Could you explain that?” 




After the broad participant-led phase of the interview, the interviewer led the 
conversation with focus area-specific questions such as “What can you tell me about 
partnerships in your organization?” and “Does your organization engage in mutual aid 
exercises?” The core component-specific questions were worded the same in each 
interview and addressed all primary components of the reference model. Importantly, 
prompted questions were only used to bring up topics that had not been addressed by the 
interviewee in the first participant-led stage of the interview. Answers were coded to 
indicate whether the information was provided without prompting or only after 
prompting. All 41 interviews were conducted in person by the lead researcher in a 
consistent manner utilizing the same interview instrument to ensure comprehensiveness 
and consistency of each interview. Each interview was recorded with the participants’ 
written permission for subsequent transcription.  
Following the completion of the interview stage, transcribed interviews were coded 
and analyzed using NVivo qualitative data analysis software to assist in comparisons of 
mental models between individual participants and with the reference model (Smythe and 
Thompson, 2015; Thompson, 2005). Using methods outlined by Morgan et al. (2002), the 
code book was developed based on the reference model with each model node, a word or 
phrase summarizing the concept or subject being discussed, included in the code book 
(Morgan et al., 2002; Hulst, 2012; Smythe and Thompson, 2015). The developed code 
book was tested with a researcher familiar with the subject area and a professional in the 
emergency response and management field to ensure consistency in coding and all 




Coding was conducted based on the “fracturing” approach (Bazeley and Jackson, 
2013) such that individual topics or concepts were coded each time they were raised 
during the interview in order to ensure accurate quantitative analysis of the subjects’ 
mental models. Coding also included recording whether the content was discussed during 
the initial “unprompted” or second “prompted” phases of the interview (Smythe and 
Thompson, 2015). The resulting interview coding was analyzed using the methodology 
developed by Smythe and Thompson (2015) to visualize and compare participants’ 
mental model comprehensiveness and balance. In order to assess and compare mental 
model comprehensiveness and balance, each interviewees’ responses were summarized to 
identify the presence or absence (whether the participant had identified each of the 
possible nodes in the reference model) and repetition (the number of times a participant 
mentioned each node) (Smythe and Thompson, 2015). The number of prompted and 
unprompted mentions of each node were also recorded in each participant summary. The 
results of all 41 participant summaries were aggregated within the four main focus areas 
of the reference model: planning, resource management, situational awareness, and 
operations/logistics.  
In order to assess the mental model comprehensiveness and balance of each 
participant and identify participants’ “default” and “complete” models, the analysis 
methods developed by Smythe and Thompson (2015) were applied to the results of the 
interview coding summaries (Table 2.1). Mental model comprehensiveness was 
measured by comparing the percentage of nodes, corresponding to concepts, in the 
reference model the participants identified with and without prompting, forming their 




model balance was determined based on the number of times a node in the reference 
model was mentioned during the interview, both in the unprompted and prompted 
portions of the interview (Smythe and Thompson, 2015). Thus, participants’ default 
(unprompted) model provides important insights into the aspects and components of 
resilience with which they are most familiar or most comfortable, or the areas that they 
feel are most important and the top priority. The complete (prompted) model is larger and 
includes topics or content that the participant feels are correct or valid but that they may 
be less knowledgeable about or believe to be less important and thus not think of until 
prompted by the researcher (Smythe and Thompson, 2015).   
Table 2.1. Mental model measure definitions (Smythe and Thompson, 2015).   
Mental model measure Definition 
Default model Model derived from unprompted open-ended section of 
interview 




Extent to which interviewees’ mental models included 
reference model components 
Mental model balance Extent to which interviewees’ mental model focuses 
equally across four reference model focus areas 
 
 This research focused on identifying and describing ERO leaders’ mental models 
brings to light the gaps in the participant’s mental models as well as the wide variety of 
mental models held by individuals within the same department and the same community. 
Assessment of the comprehensiveness and balance of individuals’ mental models 
highlights areas of strength as well as gaps in knowledge and understanding. In addition, 
the results of this study show the shifts that can occur in mental models due to discussion 




this mental model assessment provide insights to inform future emergency response 
resilience education and planning initiatives in addition to suggesting areas for future 
research.  
2.5 Results 
 The mental models of 41 ERO leaders were analyzed to identify the components, 
comprehensiveness, and balance of their mental models of resilience within their 
organizations. The results of the interview coding analysis were compared between the 
three case study sites and between organizations to fully understand the differences and 
similarities between individuals’ and organizations’ mental model comprehensiveness 
and balance. The findings of this study provide important insights into the application of 
resiliency concepts within the emergency response field.  
 The average complete comprehensiveness scores for all ERO leaders across all 
three case study sites were very similar with West Haven having the lowest (84%), and 
Stratford (89%) and Westerly (90%). Similarly, the sites’ default comprehensiveness 
scores were also close: (West Haven 45%, Westerly 49%, and Stratford 51%). As can be 
seen, however, there was a large difference between all locations’ default and complete 
scores (see Table 2.2). Westerly participants had the lowest complete model 
comprehensiveness scores for situational awareness (81%) and resource management 
(89%) with higher scores in planning (94%) and operations/logistics (95%). Stratford 
participants had similar complete model comprehensiveness scores with lower scores in 
situational awareness (78%) and resource management (87%) and higher scores in 
planning (92%) and operations/logistics (97%). West Haven participants had the lowest 




resource management (84%) lower than operations/logistics (89%) and planning (90%). 
All three sites had low default model comprehensiveness scores ranging from 36% (West 
Haven, situational awareness) to 57% (Stratford, resource management).  As Table 2.2 
illustrates, the average interviewee in each of the three case study sites increased their 
mental model comprehensiveness notably between their default and complete models, 
demonstrating how their focus and what they determined to be of greatest importance 
was far narrower than their full understanding that was revealed through prompting by 
the researcher-led structured questions.  
Table 2.2. Summary results of mental model comprehensiveness for three case study 























57% 87% 52% 92% 51% 97% 46% 78% 
 
In contrast to their mental model comprehensiveness scores, most participants’ 
mental model balance scores shifted very little between their default and complete 
models (see Table 2.3). The site with the greatest shift between default and complete 
model balance was West Haven with 1% to 3% increases in balance varying between 
focus areas. Both Westerly and Stratford show minor increases in model balance between 




Table 2.3. Summary results of mental model balance for three case study sites (D = 
default, C = complete). 
 
The results of mental model comprehensiveness and balance analysis based on 
type of ERO are displayed in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6. In order to simplify the 
comparison of mental models between locations, summarized results of mental model 
comprehensiveness and balance for each case study site are presented in Table 2.4. The 
default model comprehensiveness of the fire department leaders (53%) was very similar 
to the comprehensiveness of police (54%), emergency medical services (EMS) (53%), 
and emergency management agency staff (51%), with department of public works (DPW) 
personnel having the lowest default model score (33%). The complete model 
comprehensiveness scores are also tightly grouped for fire (89%), police (90%), EMS 
(91%), and EMA (91%), with DPW showing significant increase but still holding the 
lowest score (77%). When analyzed by ERO, participants’ show similar low changes in 
mental model balance score ranging from increases of 1-10%. The notable exception is 
department of public works personnel (DPW), who improved their default model balance 










  D C D C D C D C 
Westerly 
(n=15) 95% 20% 22% 24% 26% 17% 18% 28% 29% 
West 
Haven 
(n=10) 90% 19% 20% 17% 18% 17% 20% 30% 32% 
Stratford 




Table 2.4. Summary results of mental model comprehensiveness and balance by case 
study site. 
Site Mental Model 
Comprehensiveness 
Mental Model Balance 
 Default Complete Change 
between 
Default Complete Change 
between 
Westerly 49% 90% 41% 89% 95% 6% 
West 
Haven 42% 83% 41% 83% 90% 7% 
Stratford 51% 88% 37% 89% 95% 6% 
 
Table 2.5. Summary results of mental model comprehensiveness and balance by ERO. 
 
 The varying default and complete model scores examined by core component for 
each ERO reveal organizational strengths and gaps in knowledge or comfort levels. Fire, 
police, EMS, and EMA leaders had default model scores within a similar range across all 
four areas of focus (47-62%). However, DPW personnel had the lowest default model 
scores for planning (30%), operations/logistics (23%) and situational awareness (29%). 
DPW also had the lowest complete model score with 61% for situational awareness. 
While there was notable variability within fire, police, EMS, and EMA complete model 
scores in different focus areas, the complete comprehensiveness scores had a much 
ERO Mental Model 
Comprehensiveness 
Mental Model Balance 
 Default Complete Change 
between 
Default Complete Change 
between 
Fire 53% 89% 36% 88% 93% 5% 
Police 54% 90% 36% 84% 94% 10% 
EMS 53% 91% 38% 89% 90% 1% 
DPW 33% 77% 44% 59% 95% 36% 




smaller range, from 79% to 99%. The marked increases in model comprehensiveness 
between default and complete models are notable in all five EROs analyzed. 
Table 2.6. Summary results of mental model comprehensiveness by ERO (D = default, C 
= complete).  
ERO Resource 
Management 




 D C D C D C D C 
Fire 
(n=13) 58% 87% 53% 93% 51% 96% 48% 80% 
Police  
(n=8) 62% 88% 53% 98% 57% 96% 47% 79% 
EMS 
(n=8) 49% 93% 52% 90% 58% 96% 54% 84% 
DPW 
(n=5) 49% 81% 30% 82% 23% 83% 29% 61% 
EMA 
(n=7) 49% 87% 54% 97% 46% 99% 56% 83% 
 
 In order to visualize the changes in default and complete model 
comprehensiveness, radar graphs were made displaying the shifts in focus and balance 
for each ERO (Figure 2.3). The similar mental model balance between the default and 
complete model is clear for fire, police, EMS, and EMA, and the notable shift in the 
DPW’s balance between default and complete results in a balance comparable to the 
other EROs. The significant increase in comprehensiveness between the default and 
complete models are clearly visible for fire, police, EMS, and EMA with their 
comprehensiveness scores reaching from 89% to 91%. The DPW’s default 
comprehensiveness started much lower than the other EROs (33%) and shows 




score remains behind the complete score of the other four EROs. The implications and 










 The results of this study reveal some key considerations and essential insights into 
ERO leaders’ understanding of resilience in their organizations. Shifts and changes in the 
participants’ mental model comprehensiveness between the unprompted default and 
prompted complete model illustrate differences in what the ERO leaders know on a 
broader scale and what they value and focus on most. Prompts, in this study the 
researcher’s structured questions, can expand participants’ mental models, highlighting 
the participants’ areas of greatest attention and comfort through the unprompted portion 
of the interview and contrasting it with their wider field of knowledge. Differences 
between case study sites’ default and complete models, as well as differences between 
EROs models, provide insights about current approaches to resilience as well as areas of 
greater value, knowledge, and comfort for the participants.  
Comparing Mental Model Comprehensiveness 
Results suggest that fire, police, EMS, and EMA are more familiar with the 
concept and details of ERO resilience, as indicated by their higher default model 
comprehensiveness compared with the DPW participants. The relatively high default 
mental model balance across the three case study sites and between EROs indicates that 
the four core components are all areas in which the participants have a base level of 
comfort or experience as they were able to address nodes of the reference model in all 
core component areas. One notable exception is the DPW participants, who had the 
lowest default model comprehensiveness and balance scores. 




in previous emergency planning initiatives within their communities and many did not 
consider themselves knowledgeable enough about resilience to speak with authority on 
the subject. Of the five DPW personnel interviewed, three referred the researcher to fire 
chiefs, EMA leaders, or police chiefs for more information about resilience in their 
communities. As the results indicate, the DPW participants increased their mental model 
comprehensiveness by 44% between the default and complete model, indicating that they 
had more extensive understanding when reminded about the broader view of resilience 
through the researcher’s prompts. As previously described, DPW personnel and 
equipment serve a critical function in responding to natural disasters by clearing roads 
and providing access so fire, police, and EMS can reach individuals in need of assistance. 
One DPW director noted, “we are good at managing our equipment and our staff, I can 
tell you exactly how many trucks and plows and chainsaws I have and I know how many 
people I need to call in for a snowstorm, but I have no idea what the town’s plan is if a 
hurricane is coming our way.” This comfort with resource management and lack of 
knowledge regarding planning and operations is reflected in the mental model 
comprehensiveness of the DPW participants interviewed.  
The DPW leaders’ default comprehensiveness score was 49%, the same as EMS 
and EMA leaders, but their default scores for the other three core components were 
notably lower than their counterparts in fire, police, EMS, and EMA. While prompting 
from the researcher’s questions resulted in large increases in their comprehensiveness 
levels, DPW leaders still had the lowest complete mental model comprehensiveness score 
with 77%. Although DPW serves as an important component of the emergency 




transportation and infrastructure, not the life safety and critical response work that fire, 
police, and EMS engage in on a daily basis. As such, some of the concepts in the 
reference model are less familiar to DPW personnel, but with prompting the DPW 
participants were willing and able to talk about the areas of focus with greater 
comprehensiveness and balance. DPW personnel are an essential component of 
communities’ emergency preparedness and response resources and must be included in 
future planning and resilience knowledge sharing events or groups in order to bridge the 
gap between their daily operational focus and emergency response function.  
Catalyzing Events and Changing Times Impacting Mental Models  
The core component that received the highest default balance scores was 
situational awareness (Westerly 28%, Stratford 29%, and West Haven 30%). The 
situational awareness focus area included the nodes corresponding to the opioid crisis and 
active shooter events, impacting both the balance and comprehensiveness scores of 
participants. Increasing numbers of opioid overdoses place a significant demand on fire, 
EMS, and police departments’ financial and personnel resources and 40% of participants 
unprompted identified the opioid crisis as a concern for their organization. Active shooter 
situations were also in the forefront of participants’ minds due to the prevalence of mass 
casualty active shooter incidents in 2017-2018, with 51% of interviewees describing 
recent active shooter trainings or drills their organizations participated in within the past 
year. The prevalence and public attention drawn to both the opioid crisis and active 
shooter scenarios are reflected in the higher default mental model comprehensiveness and 
balance of ERO leaders in these case study sites. In addition to impacting the results of 




highly public and catalyzing events can have an influence on individuals’ unprompted 
default mental models and shift focus away from low probability-high consequence 
events such as natural disasters. 
 The increases in mental model comprehensiveness displayed by ERO leaders in 
all three case study sites suggest that the leaders are willing and able to change their 
mental model of resilience to be more inclusive of all core components of ERO 
resilience. Many participants stated that their organizations were resistant to change and 
old traditions and practices were difficult to alter, but 95% (38 of the 41 interviewees) 
said that their organizations had to keep up with changing times and new ideas and 
innovations. One fire chief stated, “this isn’t the world we faced as firefighters 30 or 40 
years ago. The world has changed and we need to change with it to keep providing our 
communities the best services we can.” Participants across all five organizations 
expressed interest in engaging in additional resilience training and education and 
incorporating resilience principles into their plans and protocols. In addition, ERO 
leaders in all three case study sites invited the researcher back upon the completion of 
this study to share research results and recommendations for their organizations.  
Mental Models Motivating Change  
 The large differences in mental model comprehensiveness between default and 
complete models in all three case study sites and across all five EROs suggests that there 
is an opportunity to bridge the gaps in ERO leaders’ mental models of resilience in their 
organizations. Default mental models were relatively balanced with participants 
addressing nodes in all four core component areas, but participants primarily focused on 




With prompting, the participants’ mental models expanded to include more nodes in each 
core component area, displaying greater knowledge of details relevant to each core 
component. This shift of the participants’ mental models indicates that with prompting, 
ERO leaders are more comprehensive in their approach to resiliency and thus may 
address resilience with greater thoroughness in planning efforts and training scenarios.  
Shifts in ERO leaders’ mental models of resilience may also provide opportunities 
for motivating change within the emergency response community. Research on cultural 
models, similar to mental model studies, supports the importance of cultural knowledge 
in motivating individuals to take action (Strauss, 1992; Holland and Quinn, 1987; 
Paolisso, 2002). The results of this study describing the comprehensiveness and balance 
of participants’ mental models also provides insights on the broader cultural knowledge 
of resilience in emergency response organizations. An improved understanding of these 
critical organizations’ mental and cultural models can guide future efforts to motivate 
action and set goals on an organizational and community level.  
2.7 Conclusion 
 The understanding of ERO leaders’ mental models of resilience gained through 
this research provide insights and recommendations for future applications of resiliency-
building initiatives in an emergency response context. ERO leaders have notably 
balanced and comprehensive default models of resilience and they are familiar with the 
core ERO resiliency components of resource management, planning, operations/logistics, 
and situational awareness. In addition, the participants saw the four core components as 




between components in both their default and complete models. ERO leaders are also 
willing and able to change their mental models of resilience with prompting regarding the 
various components of resilience. Thus, it is recommended that resilience initiatives 
actively recruit and involve leaders from emergency response organizations in planning 
projects and outreach efforts. Emergency responders strongly adhere to time-honored 
traditions and may be resistant to change, but ERO leaders acknowledge that the world is 
changing around them and they must proactively engage in efforts to incorporate new 
concepts, such as resilience, in their plans, policies, and response operations. Additional 
research is needed to identify the best methods for teaching resilience principles and 
strategies to emergency responders. A good initial step is encouraging ERO leaders to get 
involved with current community emergency planning initiatives and proactively 
discussing the role of resilience in their organizations.  
 One important finding of this study is the noted differences between DPW leaders 
and research participants from fire, police, EMS, and EMA organizations. Although 
DPW leaders’ focus in their day-to-day operations is not on the critical life-safety 
scenarios and events that fire, police, and EMS face on a daily basis, they are an 
important resource and contributor in emergency response to large-scale events, 
especially natural disasters. As such, DPW needs to be included in the emergency 
planning process and invited to participate in trainings and educational opportunities. 
Incorporating DPW assets and staff during exercises serves as a way to familiarize fire, 
police, EMS, and EMA leaders and personnel with the capabilities and equipment of their 
DPW colleagues and provides an opportunity for DPW leaders to participate in 




response and remain resilient during potential impacts from disasters, all emergency 
response organizations must work together and build their organizational resilience 
cooperatively.  
Gaps in ERO leaders’ mental models also provide an opportunity to tailor 
education, training, and outreach efforts to address aspects of resilience with which they 
are less familiar and comfortable. Most emergency response departments engage in 
regular training, drills, and continued education, thus incorporating resilience training and 
best practices into pre-scheduled drills or classes. In order for EROs to proactively 
include resilience factors and strategies in their plans and operations, it is vital to clearly 
demonstrate how such factors and strategies will improve their ability to safely and 
successfully carry out their critical life-safety missions during times of disaster. Building 
resilient EROs is an essential component in the development of resilient communities, 
and the results of this research highlight key areas to focus future education and planning 
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Appendix A: Informed Consent Letter 
 
Resilient Response in an Age of Change: Emergency Response Organizations’ Resilience 
in Times of Disaster 
CONSENT FORM FOR RESEARCH: INTERVIEW  
You have been invited to take part in a research project described below. The researcher 
will explain the project to you in detail. You should feel free to ask questions. If you have 
more questions later, Clara Decerbo, the graduate researcher conducting this study, can 
be reached at 802-299-5339 to discuss them with you. The total maximum time required 
for participation in this study is 1.5 hours, the maximum duration of the interview. In 
order to participate in this study you must be over 18 years old and of sound mind. This 
research project is conducted under the supervision of Principal Investigator Dr. Robert 
Thompson.  
 
Description of the project:  
This research will use data obtained through this interview to evaluate the resilience of 
emergency response organizations (EROs) during disasters. The organizations focused on 
in this study include fire departments, police departments, emergency medical services, 
departments of public works, and emergency management agencies. The results of this 
study will be used to develop guidelines and recommendations for improving the 
resilience of EROs in the United States and internationally.  
 
What will be done:  
If you decide to take part in this study, you will be interviewed regarding your opinions 
and experiences relating to emergency response organizations’ resilience to disasters. The 
interview will last 45 to 90 minutes and will be recorded with your permission. The only 
additional involvement that may be asked of you would be a brief follow-up conducted 
by the researcher within 1 year of the initial interview to clarify any responses.  
 
Risks or discomfort:  
There is minimal risk in participating in this study.  
 
Benefits of this study:  
This study will benefit emergency response organizations and emergency response 
personnel who must continue providing critical services during and immediately after 
disruptive and destructive disasters. The results of this study will also benefit 
communities negatively affected by disasters through improved resilience of their 
emergency response organizations.  
 
Confidentiality:  
Names of participants will not be used and your participation and information shared in 
this study is confidential. None of the information will identify you by name. All written 
records will be stored in a locked file cabinet in the Coastal Institute Kingston at the 




will be based on group data and will not identify you or any individual as being in this 
project. Data will be destroyed three years after the completion of the study.  
 
In case there is any injury to the subject:  
This study is not expected to cause any injury. If this study causes you any injury, you 
should write or call the office of the Vice President for Research, 70 Lower College 
Road, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island, telephone: (401) 874-4328.  
 
Decision to quit at any time:  
The decision to take part in this study is completely voluntary. If you decide to take part 
in the study, you may decline to answer any question or you may quit at any time. If you 
wish to quit during the interview, please inform the interviewer immediately. If you wish 
to quit at a later time, please inform please inform Clara Decerbo at (802) 299-5339 of 
your decision.  
 
Rights and Complaints:  
If you are not satisfied with the way this study is performed, you may discuss your 
complaints with Robert Thompson at (401) 874-4485 or rob@uri.edu, or Clara Decerbo 
at (802) 299-5339 or clara.decerbo@gmail.com, anonymously, if you choose. In addition, 
if you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the 
office of the Vice President of Research and Economic Development, 70 Lower College 
Road, Suite 2, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island, telephone: (401) 874-
4328.  
 
You have read the Consent Form. Your questions have been answered. Your signature on 
this form means that you understand the information and you agree to participate in this 
study.  
 
________________________ Signature of Participant  
_________________________ Typed/printed Name  
__________________________ Date  
________________________ Signature of Researcher  
________________________ Typed/printed name  
_______________________ Date  







Appendix B: Interview Guide 
Introductory script: 
Today I would like to talk with you about resilience in your organization.  
 
Phase 1: Interviewee-led  
I would like to begin by having you tell me about your organization and what resilience 
means to you in the context of your work. 
 
Follow-up Prompts 
• Anything else? 
• Could you tell me more about that? 
• Why is _________ important? 
• What’s being done about that? 
• What could be done about that? 
• How does that work? 
• Are there any actions addressing that problem? 
• Can you give me an example of that? 
• Why is that important? 
• How was that decided? 
• How does that affect your organization? 
• Are there any differences of opinion about that? 
 
Phase 2: Interviewer-led 
 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT  
1. What can you tell me about partnerships in your organization? 
2.  ___What are the ways your organization engages in relationship building 
activities? 
*___ Inter-organizational; *___ Intra-organizational; *___ Mutual Aid 
3. ___ What can you tell me about the role/importance the staff/personnel have in 
your organization in relation to resilience? 
*___ Adequate personnel and staffing; *___ Personal Preparedness; * ___ 
Family Preparedness 
4. ___ Describe the role resource management has in your organization. 




___ Effective management of: *___ Social; *___ Financial; * ___ 
Human/Personnel 
___ Resource availability: *___ Knowledge of and access to: *___ 
Equipment; *___ Personnel; * ___ Information 
 
PLANNING 
5. ___What can you tell me about training in your organization? 
6. ___What type of events does your organization train for? 
*___ How intensely do you train for different types? 
*___ Why do you train for these types of events and not others? How do 
you decide which events to train for? 
7. ___What are the ways your organization engages in internal exercises? 
*___ Identify gaps; *___ Identify opportunities 
8. ___What are the ways your organization engages in mutual aid exercises? What 
are some of the benefits and challenges you encounter? 
*___ Coordination *___ Communications 
9. ___What can you tell me about education in your organization? 
___What are the ways your organization engages in continuing education? 
Meeting education requirements? 
___What are the ways your organization builds internal expertise? 
 
10.___What can you tell me about disaster or incident pre-planning in your 
organization? 
*___ Incident pre-plans *___ EOPs 
 
OPERATIONS/LOGISTICS 
11. ___What can you tell me about how your organization identifies needs? 
12. ___What can you tell me about how your organization establishes objectives? 
13. ___How does your organization implement logistics? 
14. ___How does your organization manage communications? 





15. ___How does your organization manage standardized operating procedures? 
___What are the ways your organization implements and uses standard operating 
guidelines? 
16.___Does your organization use redundant systems? If so, how?  
*___ Communication; *___ Supply systems 
 
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
17. ___What can you tell me about your organizational preparedness? 
18. ___ Is your organization ready to adapt to changing conditions? Which 
conditions? How are you prepared? 
*___ Organizational change; *___ Organization structure; *___Climate 
change; *___ Extreme Storms; *___ Flooding; *___ Sea Level Rise; 
*___Changing needs; *___ Response/call types 
19. ___ What are the local risks your organization prepares for? 
*___ Human-caused disasters; *___ Terrorism; *___Accidents; 
*___Natural disasters; *___Hurricanes; *___Extra Tropical Storms; 
*___Floods 
20. ___How would you define organizational awareness? 
21. ___What can you tell me about your organizational awareness? 
*___ Successes; *___ Challenges; *___Improvement areas 
22.___What attitude/posture does your organization take towards change? 
___How does your organization anticipate impacts? How do you prepare for the 
unexpected?  
___What is your organizational culture?  
*___ Pro-change; *___ Open-minded 
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 Social capital is widely recognized as a key component of communities’ and 
organizations’ ability to withstand and recover from impacts following a disaster. The 
aspects of social capital that contribute to building resilient communities also assist 
businesses and organizations by establishing and maintaining strong networks of 
relationships within teams and between individuals in different organizations. The unique 
challenges and functions of emergency response organizations (EROs) demand a greater 
focus on identifying and implementing resilience-building practices and policies designed 
for EROs. This article presents the findings of a social capital assessment of 41 ERO 
leaders in three coastal New England municipalities. The study’s mixed quantitative and 
qualitative methods measure the EROs’ levels of bonding, bridging, and linking social 
capital and offer recommendations for how social capital may be strengthened to improve 
organizational resilience and contribute to community resilience-building initiatives. 
While the EROs assessed in this study have high levels of social capital overall, the 
organizations’ scores across the three forms of social capital highlight areas of strength 
and weakness and suggest areas for future improvement. In order to continue providing 
essential life-saving services to their communities during any disaster, EROs must build 
and maintain strong relationships and networks with other organizations and focus on 
developing and sustaining social capital.  
3.1 Introduction  
 Hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, and other natural disasters impact millions of 
people every year, disrupting communities and causing millions of dollars in damages. A 




increasing resilience focuses on policy changes designed to improve critical infrastructure 
systems. Social infrastructure also greatly affects community resilience, with elements 
such as social capital influencing how communities and organizations withstand and 
recover from impacts during and following disasters (Aldrich and Meyer, 2014). Social 
capital is defined in varying ways across the sociological, psychological, and behavioral 
literature. One commonly referenced definition is from Robert Putnam’s book Bowling 
Alone: The collapse and revival of American community (2000) in which he defines 
social capital as the “features of social organizations, such as networks, norms, and trust 
that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” and that “enable 
participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives” (Putnam, 2000, 
pg. 67). A growing body of work focuses on the impact social capital can have on 
communities’ ability to mitigate vulnerability and recover after impacts, demonstrating 
the key role social capital has in building community resilience (Aldrich, 2012; Aldrich 
and Meyer, 2014; Aldrich, 2010; Adger, 2003; Murphy, 2007; Cox and Perry, 2011). 
New research expands on previous concepts linking social capital with community 
resilience to explore the connection between social capital, resilience, and performance 
within businesses and organizations. These include but are not limited to schools, 
community-based nonprofits, and government organizations (Seville, 2017; Andrews, 
2010; Doh and Zolnik, 2011; Foster et al, 2003; Leana and Pil, 2006). 
Many components of social capital that contribute to improved resilience within 
communities are also applicable to organizations impacted by natural disasters as well as 




organization. Emergency response organizations2 are vulnerable to the same impacts as 
non-emergency response businesses, but strategies that may be implemented to assist 
other types of organizations are not all applicable to EROs due to their location-based 
critical roles during and after disaster impacts. While manufacturing and retail companies 
may move to alternative sites and continue business operations prior to disasters and 
during recovery efforts, emergency responders must provide essential life-saving services 
in the impacted communities where their stations and equipment are located. 
Additionally, many emergency response personnel live in or adjacent to the communities 
they serve, increasing the likelihood that their own homes and families will be 
experiencing the same event or disaster impacting their work communities. These unique 
characteristics of EROs demand a greater focus on identifying and implementing 
resilience-building practices and policies designed for EROs. Social capital is an essential 
component of organizational and community resilience, hence understanding the types 
and levels of social capital held by EROs provides important insights into how social 
capital may be used to improve ERO resilience. This article presents the findings of a 
social capital assessment of ERO leaders and offers recommendations for how elements 
of social capital may be applied to EROs to improve organizational resilience and 
contribute to community resilience-building initiatives.  
Components of social capital, including social networks, reciprocity, 
trustworthiness, and access to resources and capital, are essential to the resilience of 
																																								 																				
2 For the purposes of this research, Emergency Response Organizations are defined as fire, police and law 
enforcement, emergency medical services, emergency management agencies, and public works 
departments as established by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in the Emergency Services 




EROs. This study defines resilience as the “capacity of any entity – an individual, a 
community, or an organization – to prepare for disruptions, to recover from shocks and 
stresses, and to adapt and grow from a disruptive experience” (Rodin, 2014). The 
presence of high levels of social capital can contribute to higher levels of resilience 
within EROs due to stronger social bonds and greater trust between colleagues within the 
organization and between response organizations, providing responders with more 
information and access to resources. Likewise, the lack of social capital can hinder EROs 
in responding to and recovering from large scale disasters due to lack of access to social 
networks, resources, and trusted connections. Thus, social capital must be considered as 
an essential component of ERO resilience. 
Although multiple sources discuss social capital in communities, the literature 
reviewed for this study does not address the importance or role of social capital as a 
component of resilience in EROs. The purpose of this study is to assess the forms and 
levels of social capital currently held by 41 EROs leaders in three case study locations. 
As the field of social capital research expands, studies offer new approaches and 
recommendations for building and supporting social capital as an avenue to increasing 
resilience. The unique challenges inherent in EROs’ roles and responsibilities prior to, 
during, and after disasters compel research focused on the forms of social capital held by 
EROs. Additionally, the results of this study offer recommendations for ERO leaders on 
how they can encourage and support social capital development within their departments 
and organizations. 
3.2 Background 




Hanifan’s study of a rural West Virginia school community center identified 
social capital in the contact and fellowship between neighbors and cooperation between 
parts of the community that “may easily be directed towards the general improvement of 
the community well-being” (Hanifan, 1916, p. 131). This early description of social 
capital laid the foundation for many disciplines that have revised and clarified the scope, 
components, and outcomes of social capital. Some researchers, notably Coleman (1988), 
Putnam (1993), and Bourdieu (1993) describe social capital as consisting of components, 
specifically networks, norms, and trust, that form a resource for collective action. The 
networks and relationships between individuals and groups or communities are explored 
further by Portes (1998) and Putnam (1993). Putnam’s work highlights the importance of 
social connectedness, networks, and trust in establishing and maintaining social capital, 
elements that reemerge in many subsequent definitions of social capital (Putnam, 1994; 
Portes, 1998; Onyx and Bullen, 2000; Aldrich and Meyer, 2014). Due to the broad 
influence of Putnam’s definition on social capital research, this study utilizes his 
definition of the concept, focusing on networks, norms, and trust to evaluate ERO levels 
and forms of social capital. As research on social capital examines the networks, 
resources, and trust relationships within communities and organizations, the important 
ties between social capital and community and organizational resilience are highlighted 
(Tompkins, 2005).  
The field of resilience research includes social capital as a key element in many 
assessments of resilience within communities. Adger’s contributions include examination 
of social-ecological resilience in a coastal disaster framework (Adger et al, 2005), social 




capital as a contributing factor in resiliency and adaptive management (Adger, 2003). 
Aldrich expands on Adger’s work on the topic of social capital, arguing for the 
reorientation of disaster preparedness and recovery programs and plans to focus on social 
infrastructure and social capital instead of “standard fixes” focused on physical 
infrastructure and rebuilding (Aldrich, 2010, p. 1). One of the central themes that emerge 
from Adger and Aldrich’s work is the key role of social capital as a contributor to 
resilient systems.  
 A capital-based approach to conceptualizing disaster resilience identifies five 
major forms of capital (social, economic, physical, human, and natural), extending the 
social capital approach outlined by Adger et al. (2005), and providing a framework for 
defining and analyzing community disaster resilience (Mayunga, 2007; Tierney 2006). 
Aldrich (2012, p. 15) suggests that high levels of social capital serve as the core “engine 
of recovery” following a disaster more than commonly discussed factors such as 
socioeconomic conditions, population density, amount of damage or aid. Social capital 
resources, including networks of strong and weak ties within communities, community 
norms, and collective action, may be incorporated and utilized to improve communities’ 
disaster resilience (Murphy, 2007; Cox and Perry, 2011; Aldrich, 2010; Aldrich, 2012; 
Adger, 2003; Adger, 2000; Tobin, 1999).  
It is important to keep in mind that social capital can have strong positive and 
negative impacts. High levels of social capital within a community can be a benefit to 
society, contributing to community disaster resilience and providing critical networks and 
resources following a disaster; however, groups such as gangs and organized criminal 




(Murphy, 2007; Aldrich, 2012). In addition, while strong social networks may benefit the 
majority of survivors from a disaster, “marginalized groups within society that hold less 
social capital benefit little and often are harmed” by the mainstream groups holding 
stronger social capital and hence greater power and access to resources following a 
disaster (Aldrich, 2012, p. 14). Although there is extensive literature focused on social 
capital’s role in community resilience and preparedness, no research identified to date 
focuses on the role of social capital in ERO resilience.  
Social Capital in Emergency Response Organizations 
 Due to the critical nature of the work performed by EROs, social capital must be 
considered as a key component of ERO resilience. Elements of social capital relevant to 
EROs include trust and networks of relationships (Putnam, 2000).  Trust is an essential 
component of social capital and takes years to build, and times of crisis are when trust is 
most needed. If organizations do not invest the necessary time and effort in building 
strong social ties of trust and connection prior to a disaster event, ERO leaders will not 
have those relationships to draw upon in times of crisis (Seville, 2017). While 
relationships between organizations are important, the essential component is the 
relationship between people and how well they are connected with each other (Aldrich, 
2012; Barabasi, 2002). Seville (2017, p. 74) identified individuals sharing strong 
connections as “3:00am friends,” people who already know and trust each other and are 
sources that can be called upon at 3:00am for assistance and support when needed. 
Stevenson (2014, p. 183) uses the term “relational resilience” to describe the type of 
resilience created through patterns of interactions between organizations and people. 




are better able to access resources, information, or support when needed (Seville, 2017; 
Stevenson, 2014). Thus, organizations must prioritize and invest in developing and 
supporting trust-based relationships with other organizations, and individuals, in order to 
build their own resilience (Seville, 2017; Stevenson, 2014). The leaders of EROs are 
uniquely positioned to build social capital within their organizations and communities 
due to their leadership roles and influence over organizational training, planning, and 
management.  
 Bonding, bridging, and linking relationships are all important forms of social 
capital contributing to EROs’ levels of social capital. Bonding social capital, described by 
Aldrich and Meyer (2014, p. 5) as the “connections among individuals who are 
emotionally close, such as friends or family” is likely to exist within the emergency 
responder community. The strong family-like bonds within emergency response 
departments are partially formed though organizational acculturation during formal 
recruitment and training, but informal social interactions and assimilation also serve to 
reinforce these bonds (Myers, 2005). Granovetter’s work describing the “strength of 
weak ties” (1973, p. 1361) demonstrates the importance of bridging social capital, 
connections spanning social groups. Individuals working in emergency response 
organizations have been found to be highly engaged in other community activities that 
would contribute to bridging capital such as playing on and coaching sports teams, 
participating in religious organizations, and playing active roles in community groups and 
clubs (Stebbins and Graham, 2004). The linking form of social capital, “connecting 
regular citizens with those in power,” (Aldrich and Meyer, 2014, p. 6) may be found in 




appointed leaders. Many municipalities have formal or informal groups including ERO 
leaders that act as advisors to municipal leadership during pre-disaster and disaster 
periods. This linking connection provides EROs with potential resources during incidents 
and may act as a conduit for information sharing.  
Approaches to Measuring Social Capital 
Three forms of social capital are identified in current social capital research: bonding 
social capital, bridging social capital, and linking social capital (Aldrich and Meyer, 
2014; Seville, 2017; Foster, 2003; Lancee, 2010). Bonding social capital may be assessed 
through identification of social networks, family and social ties, and analysis of levels of 
mutual trust and dependence. Bridging social capital can be assessed through proxies 
such as ties to social and religious organizations, participation in voluntary associations 
and clubs, and engagement with formal and informal support groups. Linking social 
capital focuses on the networks and relationships between individuals and communities 
and those in power; thus, it may be measured through contact between citizens and 
government representatives and civic engagement in local government (Aldrich and 
Meyer, 2014).  
Within the field of social capital research, there are a variety of approaches to 
quantifying and measuring levels of social capital. Three primary approaches are 
addressed in the literature: the cognitive approach, behavioral approach, and field 
experiment approach. The cognitive approach focuses on identifying and examining 
attitudes and behaviors while the behavioral approach focuses on actions taken by 
individuals. In the cognitive approach, attitudes of individuals are used to measure 




Surveys are used to measure general trust as a component of social capital through 
multiple choice or scaled questions, asking participants how much they trust their 
neighbors, their friends, or specific groups such as community leaders, emergency 
responders, or local government officials (Putnam, 2000; Aldrich and Meyer, 2014). The 
second approach uses behavior-focused surveys to assess specific actions (donating 
blood, participating in community events, etc.) of individuals as indicators for levels of 
social trust and social capital, the behavioral approach (Aldrich and Meyer, 2014; 
National Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey, 2000, 2006). This approach also 
uses individuals’ participation in social and community events such as voting, political 
demonstrations, festivals, community organization membership, and volunteering as a 
proxy assessment for social capital. The third method uses field experiments such as trust 
games to measure social preferences (Aldrich, 2012; Aldrich and Meyer, 2014). This 
method has been used in both laboratory and field experiments (Cardenas and Carpenter, 
2008; Levitt and List, 2009).  
Some researchers combine these methodological approaches resulting in studies 
based on a mix of cognitive and behavioral measures. These studies vary in their methods 
with some using qualitative interviews and others multiple choice and Likert-scale 
surveys, but they are consistent in their use of both cognitive and behavioral approaches 
to measuring social capital. Bell (2009) developed a social capital index through 
qualitative interviews examining levels of trust, a cognitive approach, and membership 
and volunteer engagement, a behavioral approach. Numerous other researchers 
implemented similar approaches in their examinations of social capital in schools, 




between communities (Lancee, 2010; Leana and Pil, 2006; Doh and Zolnik, 2011; Onyx 
and Bullen, 2000). By combining cognitive and behavioral approaches to measuring 
social capital, these studies demonstrate a holistic method of assessing social capital.  
3.3 Methodology 
 This research seeks to measure the levels of bonding, bridging, and linking forms 
of social capital currently held by EROs in in three coastal New England municipalities. 
A Likert-scale survey of 41 participants quantitatively measured the levels of bonding, 
bridging, and linking social capital of the EROs. Following the survey, semi-structured 
interviews conducted with the same participants provided qualitative insights into the 
organizations’ social capital, giving context to, and elaborating on, the quantitative 
findings.  
Case Study Sites and Respondents  
Research participants were recruited in three case study sites in southern New 
England: Westerly, Rhode Island, West Haven, Connecticut, and Stratford, Connecticut. 
The sites are all mid-sized (23,000-54,500 according to the U.S. Census Bureau, 2011) 
coastal communities that sustained impact and damages from Superstorm Sandy (2012), 
have taken identifiable steps towards reducing future impacts of major storms, and have 
municipal-based emergency services including fire departments, police departments, 
emergency medical services (EMS), emergency management agencies (EMA), and 
public works departments. These sites were selected based on their similarities and 
subsequent comparability. Study participants were recruited from each ERO based on 




identified based on publicly available information and contacted by email inviting them 
to participate in the study. In-person interviews were scheduled in February and March 
2018 and conducted by the researcher at the participants’ place of work. A total of 41 
ERO leaders were interviewed for this research, 15 in Westerly, 10 in West Haven, and 
16 in Stratford, providing a total population sample of ERO leaders in the three study 
sites. Participants included leaders from fire departments, police departments, emergency 
medical services (EMS), department of public works (DPW), and emergency 
management agencies (EMA) (Table 3.1). Due to this study’s small sample size, the 
results may not be generalizable to a broader selection of EROs, however the sample 
includes the complete leadership of all five EROs in the three case study sites. 
Case Study Site	 Total	 Fire	 Police	 EMS	 DPW	 EMA	
Westerly, RI	 15	 n=4	 n=3	 n=3	 n=2	 n=3	
West Haven, CT	 10	 n=6	 n=2	 n/a	 n=1	 n=1	
Stratford, CT	 16	 n=3	 n=3	 n=5	 n=2	 n=3	
 
Table 3.1. Research participants represented five emergency response organizations in 
three case study sites. 
Survey Development, Administration, and Analysis 
The study design implemented in this research combines two methodological 
approaches to quantifying social capital: the cognitive approach using individuals’ 
attitudes to measure subjective levels of trust (Aldrich, 2012; Aldrich and Meyer, 2014; 




engagement, and volunteerism as indicators of social capital (Onyx and Bullen, 2000; 
Putnam, 1993; Aldrich and Meyer, 2014; Stone, 2001). These combined approaches 
provide a method for quantifying and examining the levels of social capital present in the 
case study sites’ EROs. The Likert-scale survey questions are based on the cognitive 
approach. Survey questions were developed through a review of the literature as well as 
topics related to social capital that emerged through the development of the Emergency 
Response Organizational Resiliency Framework (see Manuscript 1) and during mental 
model interviews focused on ERO resilience (see Manuscript 2). The draft survey 
instrument was tested on six individuals who met the requirements for participation but 
worked in jurisdictions outside the case study locations included in this research. 
Following testing, three survey questions were revised for clarification and the final 
survey instrument was tested on an additional three individuals with no further revisions 
made. 
The survey instrument consisted of ten 5-point Likert scale questions ranging 
from 1 (not at all, never) to 5 (very much, a lot) (Table 3.2). Questions were designed to 
quantifiably measure the participants’ levels of three identified forms of social capital: 
bonding, bridging, and linking (Putnam, 2000; Mignone and O’Neil, 2005; Aldrich and 
Meyer, 2014; Lancee, 2010; Seville, 2017; Kirmayer et al, 2009).  Individuals 
participating in this study were surveyed by the researcher in person in their place of 
work in February and March 2018.  
Forms of 




Bonding	 How much do you rely on the leaders/chiefs/directors of your 
organization? 	
How much confidence do you have in the 
leaders/chiefs/directors of your organization?	
How much do you rely on your colleagues within your 
organization?	
How much confidence do you have in your colleagues within 
your organization?	
How much do you rely on your colleagues within your 
organization to accomplish your job tasks and goals?	
Bridging	 How much do you rely on members of other emergency 
response organizations within your community? (Other fire 
departments, the police department, etc.)	
How much do you trust members of other emergency response 
organizations within your community? (Other fire departments, 
the police department, etc.)	
How much do you rely on members of other organizations to 
accomplish your organization’s tasks and goals?	
Linking	 How much do you trust community leaders within your town?	
How much connection do you think there is between citizens 
and local/municipal government in your community?	
 
Table 3.2. The three forms of social capital measured in this study with their 
corresponding Likert-scale survey questions.  
Interview Development, Administration, and Analysis 
The seven interview questions (Table 3.3) were designed to elicit a qualitative 




their jobs, organizations, and communities, as well as how social ties and connections 
impacted their response during recent disasters. Semi-structured interview questions were 
developed based on the methodology described by Wengraf (2001). A list of initial 
questions was generated with the goal of eliciting interviewees’ descriptions of bonding, 
bridging, and linking social capital in their organizations.  In order to maintain 
consistency, interview questions were drawn from the same literature and sources as the 
survey questions described previously. The draft interview instrument was tested on the 
same six individuals as the survey instrument and two interview questions were revised 
for clarification based on the test participants’ feedback. The final interview instrument 
was tested on three additional individuals with no other revisions made. The original list 
of 12 questions was consolidated and revised to the final seven questions based on 
feedback from test participants. An additional list of potential follow-up questions was 
developed in order to prompt interviewees to expand initial “yes/no” responses if 
necessary (Wengraf, 2001). Few research participants needed any prompting from the 
researcher during interviews, thus the follow-up question list was not ultimately used 
while conducting interviews. All interviews were conducted in the participants’ places of 
work during business hours in February and March 2018. Interviews were held privately 
in interviewees’ offices or conference rooms in order to maintain privacy and anonymity 
of participants’ responses. The interview portion of each meeting was recorded with 
permission of the participant for subsequent transcription and coding. 
Interview Questions	





How often do you vote? 	
Do you donate blood? How often?	
Are you a member of any community organizations, religious organizations, 
voluntary associations or clubs? How many hours do you volunteer/participate 
with each per month?	
In what ways do social ties and connections function within your organization? 
How important are these connections?	
In what ways do social ties and connections between your organization and other 
organizations within the community function? How do inter-organizational ties 
and connections affect your organization? Please describe. 	
What role did social ties and connections have in your organization’s response 
during recent disaster events? (Superstorm Sandy, Winter Storm Nemo, recent 
blizzards)	
Table 3.3. Interview questions designed to provide a qualitative description of 
participants’ bonding, bridging, and linking forms of social capital.  
Data Analysis 
In order to analyze the collected data, the Likert-scale survey questions were 
divided into three groups based on the form of social capital each question corresponded 
to (see Table 3.2). Bonding, bridging, and linking scores were calculated for each 
participant based on their mean survey responses. The resulting bonding, bridging, and 
linking scores were averaged for each ERO within each case study in order to examine 
the mean social capital score for the individual emergency response organization. These 
scores were analyzed based on case study site and ERO, allowing the researcher to 
compare study sites as well as the five EROs. These results offer a quantitative 
measurement of the forms and levels of social capital present among EROs in the three 




Responses to the interview portion of the study instrument were transcribed and 
qualitatively analyzed with the assistance of NVivo data analysis software using a general 
inductive approach (Thomas, 2006). To apply the inductive approach, the researcher 
identified and coded key themes including upper-level and lower-level categories 
(Thomas, 2006). Examples of upper-level categories include interviewees’ descriptions 
of relationships between response organizations and how their EROs obtain needed 
resources, while lower-level categories include discussion of specific trainings and 
exercises conducted and identification of individual resources such as radio and generator 
systems. Following identification and coding of categories, overlapping and redundant 
categories were revised and condensed to clarify the key themes and a code book was 
developed. Quotations that “convey the core theme or essence of a category” were 
selected to capture the key aspects of each theme (Thomas, 2006, p. 242). This method 
was selected in order to provide a thorough and descriptive assessment of EROs’ social 
capital and the role of social capital within each organization and case study site. The 
results of the analysis provide insights into the types and levels of social capital held by 
EROs, how they access and use social capital prior to and actively during events, as well 
as how ERO leaders use their understanding of social capital’s benefits and potential 
costs when dealing with intra- and inter-organizational operations. 
3.4 Results 
 ERO leaders’ responses were compared between case study sites and between 
response organizations to provide insight into EROs’ levels and types of social capital. 
The type and balance of social capital held by EROs were determined using both the 




instrument used the cognitive approach to identify levels of trust and confidence 
participants had in their leaders and colleagues within the organization, members of other 
EROs within their communities, and in community leaders. The qualitative interviews 
used the behavioral approach to capture ERO leaders’ displays of social capital in daily 
life through such indicators as membership in clubs and associations, volunteer work, 
participation in social, religious, and recreational events and altruistic behavior such as 
donating blood. Through these approaches the levels of bonding, bridging, and linking 
social capital were assessed to identify the types and strengths of connections between 







Table 3.4. Social capital components summarized including EROs from all three case 
study sites (scale 1-5 with 5 equivalent to highest level). 
When comparing the results based on ERO, the average combined social capital 
levels including the three identified forms indicate that emergency management agencies 
had the highest average social capital score (3.82) on a 1 to 5 scale with 5 indicating the 




Fire (n=13)	 3.79	 4.27	 3.87	 3.23	
Police (n=8)	 3.75	 4.10	 3.71	 3.44	
EMA (n=7)	 3.82	 4.54	 3.57	 3.36	
EMS (n=8)	 3.60	 4.43	 3.04	 3.32	




by police departments (3.75) and department of public works (3.71) with emergency 
medical services (3.60) holding the lowest average score. The difference in scores 
between the five EROs is small, with a range of 0.22 separating the highest and lowest 
scores. Examination of the average scores for each of the three forms of social capital 
reveals similarly small differences between highest and lowest scores across the 
organizations. Bonding scores go from a high of 4.54 (EMA) to a low score of 4.1 
(police), a range of 0.44. The highest score in the bridging form was 3.87 (fire) and the 
lowest was 3.04 (EMS), a range of 0.83. The range in the linking score is 0.24 with a 
high score of 3.44 (police) and a low score of 3.20 (department of public works).   
 The scores of EROs highlight the components of social capital that are strongest 
and weakest within each organization. Most EROs had closely grouped scores across all 
components, however EMS had larger differences in their scores, with high scores in 
bonding (4.43) and the lowest score of all EROs in all components with 3.04 in linking. 
Emergency management agencies had the highest average score as well as the highest 
bonding score. Police and fire departments had very similar average scores with fire 
departments having higher bonding and bridging scores and police departments having 
higher linking scores.  
Town and ERO	 Average Combined	 Bonding	 Bridging	 Linking	
Westerly, RI (n=15)	
Average	 3.58	 4.03	 3.81	 3.01	
Fire (n=4)	 3.13	 3.35	 3.42	 2.63	




EMS (n=3)	 3.67	 4.33	 3.67	 3.00	
DPW (n=2)	 3.58	 4.00	 4.00	 2.75	
EMA (n=3)	 3.65	 4.40	 3.22	 3.34	
West Haven, CT (n=10)	
Average	 3.78	 4.38	 3.74	 3.21	
Fire (n=6)	 4.08	 4.63	 4.28	 3.33	
Police (n=2)	 2.96	 3.70	 3.67	 1.50	
DPW (n=1)	 3.86	 4.40	 2.67	 4.5	
EMA (n=1)	 4.21	 4.80	 4.33	 3.50	
Stratford, CT (n=16)	
Average	 3.87	 4.54	 3.58	 3.50	
Fire (n=3)	 4.10	 4.80	 3.67	 3.84	
Police (n=3)	 3.82	 4.40	 3.22	 3.84	
EMS (n=5)	 3.55	 4.48	 2.67	 350	
DPW (n=2)	 4.02	 4.40	 4.67	 3.00	
EMA (n=3)	 3.87	 4.60	 3.66	 3.34	
 
Table 3.5. Social capital components summarized by case study site and ERO within 
each site (scale 1-5 with 5 equivalent to highest level). 
 Comparing the average combined social capital scores and individual component 
scores between the three case study sites highlights areas of social capital strength and 




three municipalities (3.87), with West Haven second highest (3.78), and Westerly having 
the lowest average score (3.58). There was no consistency across the case study locations 
in the type of EROs holding the highest and lowest scores. In Westerly, the police 
department had the highest average combined social capital score (3.87) while the fire 
department had the lowest score (3.13). In contrast, the West Haven emergency 
management personnel had the highest average combined score (4.21) with the police 
department holding the lowest average score (2.96). In Stratford, the fire department also 
had the highest average score (4.10) while EMS had the lowest score (3.55).  
 In addition to the social capital scores described above, ERO leaders’ levels of 
community engagement were assessed through the interviews based on membership in 
community organizations, volunteering, and voting in local as well as state and national 
elections. The following results should be interpreted with caution because self-reporting 
assessments of volunteering and voting behavior is prone to bias. Individuals may not 
accurately report their actions, potentially exaggerating such behaviors. This study used a 
self-reporting assessment in order to obtain data comparable to national averages (Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, 2015). 30 (73%) of the 41 participants reported that they were 
members of at least one community organization while many participated in numerous 
different organizations. One fire chief interviewed was an active member of 12 separate 
organizations and clubs and estimated that he spent approximately 80 to 120 hours per 
month in volunteer work. In Westerly, 80% of respondents participated in community 
organizations spending an average of 17.3 hours per month volunteering (see Table 3.6). 
80% of West Haven respondents also participated in community organizations, 




participated in community organizations, averaging 15.4 hours of volunteer work each 
month. Although fewer Stratford respondents engaged in community organizations, and 
they volunteered fewer hours than ERO leaders in West Haven and Westerly, all three 
case study sites had levels of organizational participation and hours of volunteer work 
that were higher than the American national average of 24.9% participation in 
organizations and 32.1 hours of volunteer work per year (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2015).  
Location	 Organizational Participation	 Average Volunteer 
Hours per Month	
Westerly, RI (n=15)	 80%	 17.3	
West Haven, CT (n=10)	 80%	 44.4	
Stratford, CT (n=16)	 62.5%	 15.4	
 
Table 3.6. Summary of ERO leaders’ self-reported organizational participation and 
volunteering. 
The ERO leaders participating in this study also had far higher voting rates than 
the national average. Among the respondents in all three sites, 90% (37) reported that 
they voted in every election, from the local school board to the national presidential 
election. The 10% (4) who reported that they did not vote in every election stated that 
they voted in every national election but not all local elections. The national average 
voter turnout is 60% of the voting age population during presidential elections and 40% 




in this study are noteworthy and suggest high levels of engagement with their 
communities (United States Elections Project, 2017).  
3.5 Discussion 
The importance of social capital in community and organizational resilience is 
widely recognized (Aldrich and Meyer, 2014; Murphy, 2007; Seville, 2017), but little 
research so far has examined social capital within emergency response organizations. The 
insights gained from the analysis and description of ERO leaders’ social capital shed light 
on the role of social capital in EROs and suggest ways that existing social capital may be 
harnessed to build ERO resilience and methods that can be used to increase and sustain 
social capital within the emergency response community.  The results of this study 
clearly indicate that EROs have high levels of social capital overall, while an examination 
of the scores across the three identified forms of social capital highlights areas of strength 
and weakness.  
Examining ERO Social Capital 
  When comparing the scores for the social capital components between EROs, 
each organization’s unique roles and focus are reflected in the high and low scoring 
components. The participants with the highest average score were the emergency 
management agencies with a score of 3.82 out of 5.00. As leaders of EMAs, individuals 
surveyed display high levels of trust and confidence in the members of other emergency 
response organizations that they must work with in preparing for and responding to 
disasters. In the three case study municipalities, there were no more than three individuals 




EMA work on a part-time basis. During interviews, study participants revealed that this 
level of staffing is typical for emergency management agencies on the municipal level in 
the New England region where many towns have part-time EMA personnel or full-time 
fire or police personnel who are tasked with additional emergency management 
responsibilities. Given that the EMA organizations in the case study sites have such low 
staffing levels, it is essential that EMA leaders work closely and have strong connections 
with the leaders of other EROs in their towns. As one participant told the researcher, “I 
can’t save this town by myself if a big storm hits, I have to work with fire, with police, 
with everyone and maybe together we can prevent the worst from happening.” EMA 
leaders also had the highest average bonding score (4.54), providing further evidence of 
the strong connections maintained within the emergency response community, especially 
within the emergency management agencies. Due to the small sample size obtained for 
this study, these results may not be representative of the larger ERO population, however 
they provide preliminary findings that may be expanded in future research.  
 Fire departments in this study had the highest average scores in bridging social 
capital (3.87) and the second highest overall score (3.79). Active engagement and 
participation with communities and other emergency responders is part of the culture of 
fire departments (Alyn, 2010; Stinchcomb and Ordaz, 2007; Gregory, 2012). Many fire 
chiefs brought this up during interviews. Building relationships with the communities 
they serve is considered “essential for maintaining good operations and providing the best 
service possible,” as one chief stated. Another chief noted that having close relationships 
with other emergency responders, especially EMS and police, “improves 




adding that “we all get more done when we can work well together.” Of the 13 fire chiefs 
interviewed for this study, 10 reported that, in the words of one interviewee, “treating 
each other like family” was a key component of fire department culture, supporting the 
high scores in the bonding form of social capital. The Westerly, West Haven, and 
Stratford fire departments actively engage in mutual aid with adjacent towns and districts, 
including participating in inter-departmental trainings throughout the year. Mutual aid 
agreements exist in many emergency response organizations and consist of formal or 
informal arrangements to assist neighboring departments when they are in need of 
additional personnel or resources. Common examples of mutual aid include an 
ambulance crew responding into a neighboring town for an emergency when that town’s 
ambulances are already occupied, or multiple towns in an area sending fire engines and 
personnel to large structure fires. A Westerly fire chief described during his interview 
how large incidents like major structure fires will usually result in firefighters from 
Westerly, Charlestown, Ashaway, Richmond, and Hope Valley Fire Departments 
working together in order to control and extinguish the fire. These types of participation 
in mutual aid agreements and training serve as one mechanism through which fire 
departments can maintain and build their bridging social capital, increasing the strength 
of connections between individuals in different departments and organizations.  
 The department of public works leaders had the fourth lowest average score 
(3.71) and bonding score (4.24) and lowest linking score of all EROs surveyed (3.2). 
Unlike the fire, police, and EMS departments, department of public work leaders 
participated in community organizations and events at far lower levels than other ERO 




jobs or organizations and were not concerned with building relationships with members 
of other EROs within their communities. One director of public works noted the 
importance of “building camaraderie and working together during big storms,” indicating 
that he wanted to have the social capital established and available to access during events. 
However, all public works directors interviewed reported that they were not considering 
efforts to build those relationships and connections prior to an incident or disaster. 
Multiple fire, police, and EMA personnel interviewed stated, in the words of one EMA 
director, “you don’t want to be trading phone numbers on the fire scene, you never want 
to trade business cards during the storm,” highlighting the importance of establishing 
relationships on “blue sky days,” prior to disasters or major events.  
Changing Communities  
 One concern voiced by multiple interview participants was the impact of shifting 
populations within communities and changes in the composition of EROs and their 
personnel. As one fire chief stated: “Back when I joined the department all the guys were 
from here, a lot of us grew up together, we went to school together, we all lived in 
town… our kids went to school together, our wives were friends, we all knew each other 
and we knew this town. This new generation, they aren’t from here… we are hiring guys 
who live 45 minutes or an hour away, they come in for their shift and they go home, they 
aren’t connected to the community anymore.” The changes in where emergency response 
personnel lived in relation to their departments was noted particularly by ERO leaders in 
Westerly and West Haven, however Stratford leaders also expressed concern that their 
personnel no longer had “connections with the community.” As new emergency 




the same neighborhoods, attend the same churches, and have children on the same sports 
teams. These findings reflect Putnam’s concerns about declining civic engagement and 
social trust, accompanied by decreasing levels of social capital linked with demographic 
changes such as where individuals live in relation to their places of work (Putnam, 1994; 
Putnam, 1995). As one fire chief stated during an interview, he felt like his personnel 
were “coming to work for the paycheck” and he missed the “camaraderie of the old 
days.” Numerous fire, police, and EMS leaders echoed this sentiment in interviews. 
Despite these concerns, two fire chiefs noted that changes in organizational hiring 
practices and, in the words of one interviewee, the increasing “professionalization of 
emergency response” resulted in higher quality candidates and better skill levels among 
their personnel. One fire chief stated, “back in the old days the main requirement to 
become a firefighter was a pulse and a reckless disregard for danger, now we are getting 
applicants with college degrees, they are brilliant paramedics and firefighters and they are 
improving the whole level of the service we provide to the community.”  
Building and Sustaining Social Capital 
Although emergency response organizations’ personnel may no longer all live in 
the community they serve due to changes in organizational hiring practices and 
community composition, in interviews ERO leaders emphasized the importance of 
building and sustaining strong relationships within their own organizations and with their 
partners in the emergency response community. ERO leaders participating in this 
research echoed some of Putnam’s recommendations for encouraging and sustaining 
social capital. Social capital “tends to be self-reinforcing and cumulative” such that 




unrelated tasks” (Putnam, 1993, p. 4). Multiple ERO leaders stated that they felt 
cooperation and collaboration during normal day-to-day operations, including training, 
cooking meals, and cleaning stations and apparatus, fostered stronger bonds within their 
departments. They also reported that regular formal and informal interactions with other 
emergency response organizations, including official drills and trainings as well as cook-
outs and softball games, built connections and relationships with neighboring 
departments and agencies. During interviews, emergency response leaders discussed their 
active engagement in planning, training, and drilling, within their departments and with 
other organizations in their town and region. Additionally, participants discussed the 
importance of supporting a culture of continual improvement and development of new 
policies and practices to ensure they are serving their communities as safely and 
effectively as possible.  
Although social capital has many benefits for EROs, it is important to be aware of 
potential negative side effects of social capital. As Durlauf (1999) notes, strong 
identification with a particular group or community (fire department, emergency response 
agency) can lead to inter-group hostility and potential conflicts with other organizations. 
Benefits accrued from social capital may not be shared with outsiders or minority groups 
(Onyx and Bullen, 2000). High levels of social capital can also give some groups priority 
access to critical resources, thereby depriving low social capital individuals or 
communities of needed resources (Aldrich 2012). One participant alluded to this when 
recounting an incident that occurred during Superstorm Sandy 2012. The emergency 
dispatch center for the town lost power during the storm, requiring the department to 




power was restored to the dispatch center quickly, but the ERO leader said that he had 
“made a few calls and had three more generators and a fuel truck in reserve” if necessary. 
By leveraging personal relationships and networks, the ERO leader ensured that his 
dispatch center had multiple back-up power sources, but also prevented these resources 
from being distributed to other locations that may have had critical needs as well. 
Although no ERO leaders specifically addressed the potential negative side effects of 
social capital, one police chief stated in an interview that “in the response community we 
are a family, we take care of each other first,” echoing the sentiments of a fire chief who 
emphasized that “the brotherhood and sisterhood comes first.” This display of high levels 
of bonding social capital has the potential to lead to exclusion of individuals identified as 
“outsiders” and protection of the “brotherhood/sisterhood” to the possible detriment of 
the larger community.  
3.6 Recommendations and Conclusion 
 The results of this research offer insights and recommendations for how EROs 
can build and sustain social capital within their organizations as well as highlighting 
areas for future research. Conscious efforts to identify, support, and encourage the 
development of social capital within and between organizations may be incorporated into 
existing training and organizational improvement strategies. Such efforts can be as simple 
as inviting departments in neighboring towns to train together more regularly, or hosting 
a table-top exercise incorporating all emergency response organizations in a municipality. 
This study revealed that fire, police, and EMS departments regularly work together 
during daily operations, building familiarity and relationships. Due to the roles and 




interact as often with the other response organizations. Thus, it is essential to include 
EMA and department of public works personnel in training and exercises whenever 
possible to ensure strong relationships are established with all response organizations 
prior to a large-scale event. In order to build their overall social capital, EMA and DPW 
leaders must understand that relationships forged during non-disaster interactions are 
more quickly activated during times of crisis and therefore far more helpful than relying 
on building relationships during an event. 
 Although previous research has identified multiple approaches to building social 
capital within communities and institutions, this study suggests ways these methods may 
be applied to emergency response organizations. Research supports the importance of 
local leaders and organizations in the establishment and development of informal 
networks that contribute to building trust (Krishna, 2007). Other research 
recommendations include implementation of policies to incentivize community 
participation in order to foster and strengthen community bonds (Aldrich, 2010; Lietaer, 
2004). Aldrich (2012) highlights the role of community clubs, faith organizations, non-
profits, and volunteer groups in increasing social capital by building trust and networks. 
These same methods of building social capital may be applied to emergency response 
organizations. ERO leaders can take active roles in developing both formal and informal 
networks within their organizations and with other response partners. Such actions may 
include encouraging a culture of collaboration and cooperation within their departments 
and providing opportunities to work with and build relationships with partner 
organizations through trainings and exercises. In addition to work-related joint trainings, 




give individuals and organizations the chance to meet and build relationships prior to 
disasters. In addition, EROs could implement policies that incentivize their members’ 
participation in community organizations and activities, thereby establishing and 
supporting networks within their communities.  
Although this research provides initial findings analyzing social capital in EROs, 
additional research is needed. An examination of the relative importance of each 
component of social capital to overall ERO resilience could give future training and 
education plans better focus and provide guidance on the most effective and efficient 
measures to implement to improve ERO social capital. Additional research on social 
capital in EROs can assist in identifying the specific forms of social capital that have the 
greatest impact on improving ERO resilience and explore potential connections with 
increasing community resilience. The connection between ERO resilience and 
community resilience must be investigated further in order to determine the methods and 
strategies that are most effective in improving both ERO and community resilience, 
including how social capital may be leveraged to increase resilience. Conducting similar 
research in other areas of the country and around the world would provide an opportunity 
to investigate social capital in EROs with different organizational structures responding 
to a variety of risks and hazards. Evaluating the role of social capital in EROs in a wider 
context would address the geographical and sample size limitations of this preliminary 
study and may provide results that are generalizable to the broader field of emergency 
response resilience. Future studies including emergency response staff and personnel, in 
addition to the organization leaders, may provide insight on variations in social capital in 




resilience and social capital research offers many opportunities for future studies with 
results contributing to the broader field of organizational and community resilience. 
Social capital is a critical component of resilience for organizations and 
communities. EROs provide essential services to communities on a daily basis as well as 
during disasters or large-scale events; thus, the resilience of EROs can directly contribute 
to community resilience. High levels of social capital within EROs contribute to building 
more resilient and robust organizations that can withstand impacts while continuing to 
provide critical services; thus, social capital of EROs must be a topic of inquiry. In this 
assessment of EROs’ levels of social capital in three coastal New England municipalities, 
the varying levels and forms of social capital highlight areas of strength and weakness 
within EROs. Through this examination of current social capital levels, areas for future 
focus and growth have been identified for inclusion in training, planning, and 
consideration of goals for each organization. Current world events including rapidly 
shifting political situations, climate change, and increasingly frequent natural disasters 
are forming an environment of constant change and uncertainty in which organizations 
and communities must be resilient in order to survive. Emergency response organizations 
are strongly rooted in their histories and traditions, but must embrace resilience to ensure 
their ability to continue providing essential services to their communities. It is crucial that 
EROs build and maintain strong relationships and networks between organizations in 
order for them to fulfill their mission: ensuring the health and safety of the communities 
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Appendix A: Social Capital Survey and Interview Instrument 
Please rank the following questions on a scale of 1-5 with 1 equivalent to “not at all” and 
5 equivalent to “very much”: 
1. How much do you rely on the leaders/chiefs/directors of your organization?  
2. How much confidence do you have in the leaders/chiefs/directors of your 
organization? 
3. How much do you rely on your colleagues within your organization? 
4. How much confidence do you have in your colleagues within your organization? 
5. How much do you rely on members of other emergency response organizations 
within your community? (Other fire departments, the police department, etc.) 
6. How much do you trust members of other emergency response organizations 
within your community? (Other fire departments, the police department, etc.) 
7. How much do you trust community leaders within your town? 
8. How much do you rely on your colleagues within your organization to accomplish 
your job tasks and goals? 
9. How much do you rely on members of other organizations to accomplish your 
organization’s tasks and goals? 
10. How much connection do you think there is between citizens and local/municipal 
government in your community? (1 = none, 5 = highly connected) 
 
Please answer the following questions and describe your answers: 
1. How often do you participate in community events such as parades, festivals, or 
demonstrations?  
2. How often do you vote?  
3. Do you donate blood? How often? 
4. Are you a member of any community organizations, religious organizations, 
voluntary associations or clubs? How many hours do you volunteer/participate 
with each per month? 
5. In what ways do social ties and connections function within your organization? 
[For each of the listed functions indicate its importance on a Likert scale] 
6. In what ways do social ties and connections between your organization and other 
organizations within the community function? How do inter-organizational ties 
and connections affect your organization? Please describe.  
7. What role did social ties and connections have in your organization’s response 
during recent disaster events? (Superstorm Sandy, Winter Storm Nemo, recent 






The challenges facing emergency response organizations today are growing larger 
and more complex in a rapidly evolving world of climate change, natural disasters, drug 
epidemics, international and domestic terrorism, and increasingly frequent active shooter 
incidents. In order to be better prepared to withstand impacts and continue providing 
critical services to communities during and after disaster events, EROs must become 
stronger and more resilient. Emergency responders strongly believe in time-honored 
traditions and some may be resistant to change, but ERO leaders acknowledge that the 
world is changing around them and they must proactively engage in efforts to incorporate 
new concepts such as resilience in their plans, policies, and response operations. The 
emergency response organizational resilience factors identified through the Delphi expert 
survey form a foundation on which to build stronger, more resilient response 
organizations that will be prepared to face new and unexpected threats and challenges in 
the future. By implementing the eleven key factors identified through this research, 
emergency response organizations can grow into resilient organizations better prepared to 
serve and protect their communities in an age of increasing change. 
The understanding of ERO leaders’ mental models of resilience gained through 
this research provide important insights and recommendations for future applications of 
resiliency-building initiatives in an emergency response context. ERO leaders have 
notably balanced and comprehensive default models of resilience and they are familiar 
with the core ERO resiliency components of resource management, planning, 
operations/logistics, and situational awareness. ERO leaders are also able and willing to 




contributing to ERO resilience, indicating that tailored trainings and education efforts 
may produce effective change in EROs’ overall models of resilience. Actively 
encouraging leaders from emergency response organizations, including public works 
departments, to get involved in current community emergency planning initiatives and 
proactively discussing the role of resilience in their organizations is a good initial step. 
Throughout the research process, multiple ERO leaders in all three case study sites 
requested feedback from the researcher following completion of the study on how their 
organizations can take steps to become more resilient. There is a clear desire among ERO 
leaders to be as prepared as they can possibly be, and there is increasing understanding 
that resilience needs to play an important role in ERO planning, policies, and training.  
Identifying gaps in ERO personnel and leaders’ mental models of resilience 
highlight opportunities to tailor education, training, and outreach efforts to address the 
aspects of ERO resilience that they are less familiar with and/or do not understand fully. 
It is important to note that it may be difficult to motivate ERO personnel to change long-
standing traditions and practices and it is vital to clearly demonstrate how resilience 
factors and strategies will improve their ability to safely and successfully fulfill their 
critical life-safety function during times of disaster. In addition, evaluating EROs’ level 
and type of social capital can assist in identifying key methods for supporting existing 
relationships and networks and establishing new ones. Through an examination of current 
social capital levels, areas for future focus and growth may be identified for inclusion in 
training, planning, and consideration of goals for each organization.  
The effective incorporation of resiliency-building factors and practices in EROs 




and strategies to emergency responders. Additionally, the connection between ERO 
resilience and community resilience must be investigated further in order to determine the 
methods and strategies that are most effective in improving both ERO and community 
resilience. Building resilient EROs is an essential component in the development of 
resilient communities, and the results of this research highlight key areas to focus future 
education and planning efforts. Emergency response organizations are strongly rooted in 
their histories and traditions, but must embrace resilience to ensure their ability to 
continue providing essential services to their communities. 
 
 
 
 
